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THE THEORY
OF
HUMAN PROGRESSION

BY
PATRICK EDWARD DOVE

Abridged by
JULIA A. KELLOGG



NEW YORK
ISAAC H. BLANCHARD COMPANY
1910

THERE can be no hope of progress or freedom for the people without the unrestricted and complete enjoyment of the right of free speech, free press and peaceful assembly.

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THE SMALL
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FOREWORD

THE purpose of this abridgement is to aid the Propaganda now in progress for a reform in our land-tenure in line with the ideas of Henry George: as promulgated in his great book, "Progress and Poverty," a reform generally known as "The Single Tax." To this end the parts of the work upon the ownership of natural resources, and kindred topics, are given nearly in full, the metaphysical parts, on the other hand, being given only with sufficient completeness to induce those readers who are interested in the *philosophy* of progress to have recourse to the original for themselves.

Our author shows clearly that land is *naturally* common property and that the failure to see this and to adjust our system of political economy to its truth is the supreme cause of poverty with all the suffering and degradation that poverty entails.

J. A. K.

"Slowly comes a hungry people; as a lion creeping nigher
Glares at one that nods and winks behind a slowly-dying
fire."

TENNYSON.

447935



THE BOOK AND THE AUTHOR

ABRIDGED FROM ALEXANDER HARVEY, EDITOR

PATRICK EDWARD DOVE was a Scotchman, born at Lasswade, near Edinburgh, July 31, 1815. His father was a Lieutenant Dove of the royal navy. The families of both parents had been for generations rich and prominent. The Doves had given many officers of high rank to the navy of their king, and one ancestor had been bishop of Peterborough, famous in his day. Commander Francis Dove settled the family in Devonshire in 1716.

Patrick Edward received a good education in his own country and in France. From the French Academy he was expelled in disgrace for leading his fellow-students in an open insurrection against the tutors. On leaving school he had the intention of going into the navy, but he yielded to his father's wish that he should be a gentleman farmer, and went up to Scotland to learn something of husbandry. He led practically, however, the life of a gentleman of leisure, reading and traveling, making several tours on the continent and residing for some years in France.

In 1840 he came into his property and the next year took the estate called "The Craig."

He was said to be the most popular landlord in Scotland. But this landlord did not believe in landlords. He maintained that the soil of a nation was the inheritance of all its people. He was never weary of repeating that rent should go to the State for the benefit of all.

Also, he did not believe in the game laws. He had no keeper on his great estate and no poacher was ever interfered with. Another peculiarity was his friendship for Ireland. He stood up stoutly for the Irish peasantry and denounced Britain's treatment of it.

For seven years he lived thus happily on his estate, but in 1848 an imprudent investment swept away his fortune. Soon after that he married, his bride being penniless like himself. The newly-wedded couple went to live in Darmstadt, where the husband studied and lectured and wrote. They were never unprosperous.

"The Theory of Human Progression" was the first fruit of this toil. The work appeared anonymously. A limited edition was published in 1850, both in London and Edinburgh. In brief, the book is the single-tax theory elucidated a generation in advance of Henry George. What Dove did for scholars, George achieved for the masses.

Economic works were not widely read at that time. Nevertheless Carlyle read and praised the volume. Sir William Hamilton, the great philosopher, pronounced it epoch-making, and our own Charles Sumner was so impressed by it that he circulated many copies in the United States and persuaded Dove to write in behalf of the emancipation movement. For all that the book failed to make its way and before many years was utterly forgotten.


On leaving Germany Dove settled in Edinburgh and soon acquired reputation as a teacher and writer.

The latter part of his life was characterized by an interest in military matters. He was a man of peace, a devout Christian and a scholar, yet he was deeply imbued with the idea of the ultimate necessity of social revolution. He freely expressed the opinion that the masses in their own interest should familiarize themselves with the

technicalities of warfare. He did his best to popularize this sort of knowledge. In 1848 he produced a treatise on the Revolver and the handling of firearms generally. He even went to the length of inventing a rifle cannon which was commended by competent authorities. He had command also of a rifle corps and of a regiment of volunteers which he drilled and equipped himself. He became an authority on the militia.

By this time he was residing in Glasgow, and in 1860 he was suddenly stricken with paralysis. Henceforth he lived mostly a retired life and died April 28, 1873.

NOTE.—It is pleasant to know that he lived to see the abolition of slavery in the United States, which he had foretold years before as a deduction from the general principles of his own theory of the progress of mankind.



DEDICATION

To

MONSIEUR VICTOR COUSIN,

Prof. of Philosophy at Paris.

To you I beg leave to dedicate the following Essay on Human Progression, with those sentiments of esteem and admiration which I share in common with so many of my countrymen.

The truth I endeavor to inculcate is—That credence rules the world—that credence determines the condition and fixes the destiny of nations—that true credence must ever entail with it a correct and beneficial system of society, while false credence must ever be accompanied by despotism, anarchy, and wrong—that before a nation can change its condition it must change its credence; that change of credence will of necessity be accompanied sooner or later by change of condition: and consequently, that true credence, or in other words knowledge, is the only means by which man can work out his wellbeing and ameliorate his condition on the globe.

The question is often asked, What is the use of philosophy?—nor is the answer difficult. Next to religion, philosophy is, of all known causes, the element that most powerfully tends to determine the condition of a country. It is a power—a power so vast that we are scarcely likely to overestimate its effects; and, though it must ever be unable to solve the great questions in which our race is involved, it may, by uprooting political superstitions and false religions, exercise an influence that no calculation can compute. The theories of one generation become the habitual credence of the next; and that habitual credence, transformed into a rule of action, is ere long realized as a palpable fact in the outward condition of society. And thus it may be truly said—As the philosophy of a country is, so its condition will be.

To no one could I dedicate a work intended to elucidate these principles, so appropriately as to yourself—to you, Sir, who have labored so earnestly and so well to give to your countrymen a correct system of Ethical Philosophy, and, through them, to communicate to Europe a scheme of natural morals which must ere long bear a rich and most beneficial harvest.

Accept, Sir, the dedication of this work as a tribute of respect from your sincere admirer.

THE AUTHOR.

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INTRODUCTION

PRELIMINARY EXPLANATION OF THE NATURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BEFORE attempting to exhibit an argument to establish the possibility of a science of politics it is necessary to define exactly what we mean by such a science.

Science is nature seen by the reason, and not merely by the senses. Science exists in the mind, and in the mind alone. Wherever the substantives of a science may be derived from, or whatever may be their character, they form portions of a science only as they are made to function logically in the human reason. Unless they are connected by the law of reason and consequent, so that one proposition is capable of being correctly evolved from two or more other propositions, called the premises, the science as yet has no existence, and has still to be discovered. Logic, therefore, is the universal form of all science. It is science with blank categories, and when these blank categories are filled up, either with numbers, quantities, and spaces, as in the mathematical sciences, or with qualities and powers of matter, as in the physical sciences, mathematics and physics take their scientific origin, and assume an ordination which is not arbitrary. Science, then, wherever it is developed, is the same for the human intellect wherever that intellect can comprehend it. It abolishes diversity of credence, and re-establishes unity of credence.

Politics is the science of Equity, and treats of the relations of Men in equity.

It professes to develop the laws by which human actions ought to be regulated, in so far as men interfere with each other.

In position it is posterior to political economy and anterior to religion. Its principal substances are: Man, Will, Action, Duty, Crime, Rights, Wrongs and Property; and the general problem is to discover the laws which should regulate the voluntary actions of men towards each other, and thereby to determine what the order of society in its practical construction and arrangement ought to be.

It is quite evident that the earth cannot function in political economy until it is transformed into a power of production having a value. And, to carry it forward into the science of politics, all that is requisite is to apply the axiom, "an object is the property of its creator"; so that when political economy has determined, by a scientific method which is not arbitrary, what value is created and who creates this value, politics takes up the question where political economy had left it, and determines, according to a method which is not arbitrary, to whom the created value should be allocated.

In man, the subject, lies the whole question of human liberty; in the earth, the object, the whole question to human property: and political science, if it be really and truly a branch of knowledge must assume to determine, not merely the laws that should regulate an individual but any number of individuals associated together. Science can acknowledge no arbitrary distinctions. If there be a rule at all, it must be general, and therefore political science must assume to determine the principles upon which political so-

cieties ought to be constructed, and also to determine the principles on which human laws ought to be made.

And as there cannot be the slightest doubt that God has made truth the fountain of good, it may perhaps be fairly expected, that if ever political science is fairly evolved and really reduced to practice, it will confer a greater benefit on mankind and prevent a greater amount of evil, than all the other sciences.

Political science is peculiarly man-science; and though, as yet, the subject is little or no better than a practical superstition, we propose, in the present volume, to exhibit an argument, affording, we think, sufficient ground for believing that it will, at no distant period, be reduced to the same form and ordination as the other sciences.

Of course, anything like a unity of credence is at present altogether out of the question. Such a unity is neither possible nor desirable. It could only be a superstition—that is, a credence without evidence. To produce conviction, therefore, is not so much our hope, as to endeavor to open up the questions that really require solution.

The first question in every branch of knowledge is its method. Without method there can be no standard of appeal—no means of determining whether a proposition is true or false. Whatever system may be practically adopted, that system necessarily involves a theory; and the question is, “Is there any possibility of discovering or evolving a natural theory which is not arbitrary?” Is there in the question of man’s political relation to man, a truth and a falsity as independent of man’s opinion as are the truths of geometry or astronomy? A truth there must be somewhere, and in the present volume we attempt to exhibit the probability of its evolution.

Our argument is based on the theory of progress, or the fact of progress; for it is a fact as well as a theory. And the theory of progress is based on the principle, that there is an order in which man not only does evolve the various branches of knowledge, but an order in which man must necessarily evolve the various branches of knowledge. And this necessity is based on the principle, that every science when undergoing its process of discovery is objective, that is, the object of contemplation; but when discovered and reduced to ordination it becomes subjective, that is, a means of operation for the discovery and evolution of the science that lies logically beyond it, and next to it in logical proximity.

If this logical dependence of one science on another could be clearly made out for the whole realm of knowledge, it would give the outline, not only of the classification of the sciences, but of man's intellectual history—or his intellectual development—where the word development means, not the alteration of man's nature, but the extension of his knowledge, and the consequent improvement of his mode of action, entailing with it the improvement of his condition.

And if the law of this intellectual development can be made out for the branches of knowledge which have already been reduced to ordination, it may be carried into the future, and the future progress of mankind may be seen to evolve logically out of the past progress.

In attempting to classify the sciences, and to show that they evolve logically out of each other, we do not profess, in the slightest degree, to discourse on the matter of the sciences themselves, further than their primary propositions are concerned; but on their form, their position, their actual development (as com-

monly acknowledged), and on the lesson which, as a whole, they must ultimately teach.

Every function, of whatever character, or wherever found, we assume to present itself under the form of

An Agent, An Object, A Product;
and this division belongs, in no respect, to any one particular science, but to all. While a science is undergoing its process of discovery, this logical ordination of its parts cannot be made on sufficient grounds.

Under these circumstances, we have given only a general estimate, sufficient to direct the line of argument without trespassing on special departments, or intruding opinions on subjects that lie beyond our province. To construct an argument that should be in the main correct, is all we could hope to achieve.



CHAPTER I

THE ELEMENTS OF HUMAN PROGRESSION

ADISTINCTION must necessarily be drawn between the science of politics itself, and its application to Man.

The science is purely abstract and theoretic. It professes only to determine the trueness or falsity of certain propositions which are apprehended by the reason.

But when we admit the fact that man is a moral being, the theoretic dogma becomes transformed into a practical rule of action, which lays an imperative obligation on man to act in a particular manner, and to refrain from acting in another manner. The theoretic truth determines the relations of moral beings, and consequently determines what ought to be their conditions with regard to each other; the practical rule determines what man may, or may not, do justly, and consequently what the political construction of civil society ought to be.

The science of politics then treats of equity, and of the relations of men in equity. All questions of politics may be discussed under the heads of liberty and property, bearing in mind always that political science treats exclusively of the relations of men.

An exposition of the laws of liberty should determine the moral rules that preside over the actions of men in the matter of mutual interference; while an exposition

of the laws of property should determine the moral rules that preside over men in their possession of the earth.

But politics, taking into consideration only the relations of men, cannot take cognizance of any duty which would still be a duty if only one man were in existence. The duties of religion that relate to the Creator are beyond and above the sphere of politics; and so also are the duties of benevolence, which belong to another category than equity.

It is only as men may act towards each other equitably or unequitably that we consider their relations. An act of benevolence is not, strictly speaking, either equitable or unequitable. The recipient has no equitable claim to the bounty; and what the donor gives, he gives not to satisfy the law of equity, but a higher law, which applies to him as an individual, but which it is impossible to apply (by law and force) to a society. The relations of men in society must first be constructed on the principle of equity, and then each individual may exercise his benevolence as occasion may require. Were there no equity there could be no benevolence, because no man could know what was his own, or what he had a right to give.*

Liberty signifies the condition in which a man uses his powers without the interference of another man. It differs from freedom in the circumstance of amount. Freedom appears to signify the absolute condition in which interference by human will is altogether removed. Liberty appears capable of indefinite variation: from the smallest amount that the most oppressed

* For instance, the kings of England gave lands (which belonged to the crown, that is, to the nation) to private individuals. The question then is, had the incumbent monarch a right to alienate those lands in perpetuity from the nation?

slave has, to the utmost and most perfect amount, which then becomes freedom.*

Liberty, in its most extensive signification, involves the whole powers or conditions of men which can be affected by the agency of other men; but liberty has also a more restricted signification, which confines it to liberty of thought, speech, publication, and action. In the former sense, life is involved in liberty; in the latter sense, life assumes a separate standing, and becomes a category by itself. And again, the moral feelings may be interfered with by slander or defamation; and this gives rise to another category of politics, namely, reputation.

Life, liberty, property, and reputation, are then viewed as the possessions of men; and the laws which should regulate men in their mutual action on each other, with regard to life, liberty, property, and reputation, have to be determined by political science.

The genuine essence of all liberty is non-interference, and to secure universal non-interference is the first and most essential end of all political association.

But interference may be from the government and law, quite as much as from the individual, and interference by law is incomparably more prejudicial to a community than any amount of casual interference that would be likely to take place in a civilized country.

Liberty presents itself under the form of liberty of thought, liberty of speech, liberty of publication and liberty of action, and political liberty evolves chrono-

* Such at all events would seem to be the sense usually affixed to the two terms. But, in that case, the word freedom would advantageously supplant liberty in several passages of the New Testament.

logically in the order of thought, speech, publication and action. To secure this liberty by law and to make it exactly equal for all individuals in the eye of the law is the great end of political civilization.

Time was in Briton when men attempted to control each other in their thoughts, and unless a man renounced his creed he was tortured by the ruthless arm of power and carried to the stake. Feeling is not under man's control, and therefore they have allowed each other to escape from profession upon that subject, at the same time taking advantage of the nerves for the infliction of as much pain as man could reasonably devise.

Speech is still, and properly enough, made a matter of superintendence. A man may injure another by his speech, and consequently speech does come within the limits of politics. Immense changes, however, have taken place in the laws that relate to the expression of thought, more especially on political subjects. Freedom of speech, and of public speech, and in any number of speakers or auditors, is one of the first essentials of true liberty.

Freedom of discussion is the great turning-point of liberty, the first great field of battle between the nation and the rulers. If the nation gain the day, its progress is onward towards freedom; but if the rulers gain the day, the nation must submit to tyranny, and must groan under the licentious hand of a self-constituted government. So soon as freedom of speech is prevented, no other resource than revolution can possibly remain, and the men who might not speak with tongues must have recourse to weapons of more powerful argument. Where there is freedom of discussion, there is always hope for the nation. The government may enforce its privileges for a time; but so

certainly as freedom of discussion is preserved, so certainly must those privileges be curtailed, one after another, and freedom of action must eventually complete the evolution.

Writing and publication are as essential as speech. The censorship is an abomination altogether incompatible with freedom.

England has almost achieved her emancipation in the matter of thought, speech, and writing; but very considerable changes still remain to be effected before liberty of action can be said to be achieved. There are actions which are naturally crimes, and which never can be anything else than crimes—robbery and murder, for instance. Such actions are criminal anterior to all legislation, and independently of any human enactment whatever. They are unjust from their nature, and we can predicate, *a priori*, that they are unjust, as well as prove, *a posteriori*, by their effects that they are eminently prejudicial.

Such actions, and such actions alone, is the government of a country competent to prohibit, and to class as crimes. But let us observe what takes place in actual legislation. No action can be less criminal than the purchase of the productions of one country, and the transport of those productions to another country, for the legitimate profit of the trader and the convenience of the inhabitants. The government, however, passes a law that such transport shall not be allowed, and that the man who still persists in it shall be called a criminal, and treated as such. The government thus creates a new crime, and establishes an artificial standard of morality, one of the most pernicious things for a community than can possibly exist, as it leads men to conclude that acts are wrong only because they are forbidden, and also enlists in favor of

the offender those feelings which ought ever to be retained in favor of the law.

The restriction would be a crime if it were only a restriction, and prevented the international exchange of produce. But what are its effects? It calls into existence a set of men who devote themselves by profession to infringe the law. The act of transport is perfectly innocent and highly beneficial; but so soon as it is prohibited by law, the man who engages in it is obliged to use the arts of deception and concealment, and from one step of small depravity to another, sinks lower and lower, until at lasts he employs violence, and does not hesitate to murder. The act of transport in which the smuggler is engaged is one of the most legitimate modes of exercising the human powers. Every kind of advantage attends it. First, it is profitable to the foreign seller. Second, it is profitable to the merchant. Third, it is profitable to the carrier. Fourth, it is profitable to the home consumer; for if the goods were not more highly esteemed by him than the money, he would not purchase them at the price. And fifth, it is injurious to no one. The first three profits are money profits; the fourth, a profit of convenience and gratification. But the moral effects are no less beneficial. First, the man who is engaged in lawful trading is well employed, and likely to be a peaceful and good citizen. Second, the fact of purchasing from a foreigner gives the trader an interest in that foreigner, and eminently tends to break down those national antipathies which have descended from the darker ages. The buyer and the seller are a step further from war every bargain they conclude in honest dealing; and the iniquitous doctrine, that a "Frenchman is the natural enemy of an Englishman," must every day find its practical refutation in the sub-

stantial benefits of trade. First, then, the prohibitory law sacrifices all those benefits, and the law of restriction diminishes them to the full extent of its restriction. But what takes place? The contraband trader is created by the prospect of gain arising from the increase of price. The increase of price, instead of being a benefit to the legal trader, is his curse. It is neither more nor less than a premium held out to the smuggler to evade the custom and to undersell the legal trader, thereby tending constantly to reduce his profit, as well as to diminish his sale. But this is not all. It is a premium to the reckless to break the law; and the man who lives in the habitual breach of the law soon becomes a ruined character and a ruined man.

There are, perhaps, few courses of life that end so certainly in ruin as the smuggler's and the poacher's; and yet, barring the law, the acts in which they are engaged are perfectly innocent and perfectly legitimate. The man who takes to smuggling or to poaching as the means of gaining his bread, is almost as certainly beyond recovery as the drunkard or the thief. It has been our lot to see some of these characters, and to observe the influence of their pursuits, and we can say no otherwise than that we have been shocked to see men of energy and great natural endowment destroyed by the temptations which the law had so superfluously placed in their way. When once the habit of breaking the law is established, the distinction is overlooked that would not otherwise have been forgotten, namely, that there is a right and a wrong independently of the law; and the man who commenced by shooting a hare in his cabbage-plot finishes by shooting a keeper, and expiating the offence on the gallows.

We do not mean that a man has a right to shoot everywhere and anywhere, but we mean that the act of

shooting the game, the legal crime, is not a crime, and never can be such; and that the consequences are in a great measure the fruits of the law, and must be charged against it.

Let us take another case. The Creator, in his bounty, has distributed rivers over our country; and the rivers of Scotland, at a certain season, teem (or did teem till the sea nets were established) with abundance of food in the shape of salmon, which are thus brought, as it were, to the very door of the inhabitants. The uncultivated moors of the same district abound with wild birds, to an extent perhaps unequalled in the world. It might be supposed reasonable that these gifts of Providence should be of some service to the stated inhabitants who labor; and as corn land is not so plentiful in the north as in the south, Providence appears to have thrown the salmon and the grouse into the scale to furnish the necessary food for man. But what has the law done? To shoot a grouse is not merely a trespass on the occupier of the land, but a crime, a criminal act, a thing that must be punished, a deed for which the half-starved Highlander can be haled to prison, and shut up as an offender against the laws of his country, when that country had reduced him to the verge of starvation. And to spear a salmon, a fish from the sea that no man may ever have seen, and cannot possibly recognize, is also attended with pains and penalties for killing the fish that Heaven had sent for food.

Let us consider that Providence has made some animals susceptible of domestication. A man takes the trouble of rearing a lamb or a bullock; and by every principle of equity they are his—at least he has the claim of preference, which no other man has a right to invade. Were any man to take this sheep or ox

for his own use, we see at once the impropriety of the action. First, it is an interference with another man without a justifying reason; and second, were such interference allowed generally, the domestication of animals would cease, and food would become so much the less abundant.

In this case there is a breach of equity involved, and the taking is a crime. But, on the other hand, Providence has made other animals incapable of domestication, and distributed them over the country, apparently for the very purpose of affording food, and this is in the very districts that are not so highly favored with the cereal productions of the soil. Such, in Scotland, are the salmon and the grouse; and these, at one period, were so abundant as to afford a staple article of food, and even now are sufficiently numerous to feed a large portion of the population from August to December. And what has the law done with regard to these bountiful gifts of Providence? The law has made it a crime for the poor man to touch them. The poor man now can never legally have either a salmon or a grouse; and in the very parishes where those animals are sufficiently numerous to feed the whole resident pauper population, the poor may take their choice between starvation and expatriation.

Now, in the case of the animals that are not capable of domestication, there is an important distinction to be observed. To shoot one of these animals is not a breach of equity—that is, the wild one is no man's property, while the domesticated one must practically be regarded as such; and therefore, as the wild animals could not be regarded as property—for property must be recognizable—the law has made it a crime for the poor man to take them for his use. And the privileged classes, not content with all the land, and nearly

all the offices of the state, have usurped the fowls of the air, and the fish of the sea, that never owned a master save the Lord of heaven and earth.

It may be considered that the question is of no great importance; neither perhaps is it, compared with the weightier question of the land; but we have taken it as an illustration of the principle of legislation as regards action. As regards action England is not a free country, and the sooner the nation is convinced of the fact, the better for the community. And by free country, we mean a country in which every man has a legal right to do everything that is not naturally a crime. Where a man can do what is a crime, freedom is no more. But the law may be the criminal as well as the nation; and injustice from the law is quite as unjust, and ten times more detrimental, than injustice from the individual.

With regard to the crime, the real criminality of the action, measured either by reason or by Scripture, and with regard to the detriment, measured by the consequences, let us ask the following question, and let any man answer it on his conscience:—Here are animals provided by nature in abundance—they cannot follow even the laws of property established in all analogous cases, inasmuch as they are not recognizable, and cannot be claimed as ever having been in possession. These animals are distributed widely, and spread throughout the country in a manner to afford a convenient supply to the various districts. The fish arrive from the sea in their highest condition, and afford good and wholesome food. The birds are of the poultry kind, distinguished for the quality and quantity of their flesh, and for their powers of reproduction,—characters that have always drawn a line of demarcation between them and the birds of prey, and

pointed them out for food. These animals are distributed by nature throughout the habitable districts where cultivation must be limited, and where animal food must be required, both from the scarcity of corn and from the nature of the climate. Such, at least, is the judgment of Providence, as manifested in the works of creation, and in the harmony which is everywhere perceptible between the productions of a region and their suitability to man. These districts (from the monopoly of the land) are now inhabited by a race reduced to the lowest state of poverty, and in many cases to a degradation that would class them with the savages. Let us ask, which is the crime? That these people should take the animals which nature has provided, or that the privileged classes of the country should pass a law to prevent their touching a single one of them, under the pain of fine and imprisonment? And be it remarked, these animals are not property, even by the wording of the enactment, which does not punish for interference with property, but for interference with animals, which the privileged classes wish to monopolize for other purposes. Hundreds of tons of fish, and thousands of boxes of birds, are annually taken away for sale from these districts, and yet not one of the poor of the inhabitants may touch a feather, nor finger a scale, without being guilty of a crime; and from one year's end to the other, the mass of the population have not the legal right to take one single meal from a bird without danger of imprisonment, nor from a fish without danger of a fine. Is it a crime, or is it not, that the privileged classes should pass such a law? And is it a crime, or is it not, that the nation should allow such laws, and such privileged classes, to continue?

Again, the manufacturers of certain articles, who

are certainly not guilty of crime, or even of the shadow of offence, are not allowed to carry on the necessary operations except under the lock and key of the state officials; and the regulations are of so stringent a character, that if they were not partially relaxed by the excisemen, the business could scarcely be carried on without incurring penalties from the law.

The soap manufacturer is certainly engaged in the production of an article that benefits the community; and even the distiller (for whom as much cannot be said) is entitled to carry on his business on the same footing as every other man. The legislators make a pretext of revenue; and revenue of course is necessary, although not to the extent to which revenue is raised in Britain. But when the necessity of revenue is granted, is it at all necessary that the man who is engaged in the lawful manufacture of an article required by the community, should be obliged to give notice to a state official that he is about to perform this, that, and the other process of his manufacture, and be esteemed a criminal worthy of punishment if that notice is forgotten or neglected?

All these restrictions are the remnants of the more exclusive privileges claimed and enforced by the privileged classes of other times, and the remnants of that political superstition which, next to religious superstition, every man ought to lend his aid to destroy.

The pretext that revenue is necessary, is one that would scarcely be entitled to attention, were it not accompanied by the injustice and detriment that follow in its train. Revenue, so far as necessary for the actual requirements of a state, need form a very trifling portion of a nation's expenditure. The whole cost of the administration of justice, and of every other valuable service that the state really requires, is a mere

trifle in comparison to the actual revenue, and to the still greater cost occasioned by the enactments of the legislature. But as revenue may be derived from two sources, the privileged classes have taken care that it shall be derived from that source in which they are not so immediately interested.

We have spoken of the liberty of human actions; and one of the forms of that action is labor. The material objects of the creation possess a value of exchange; that is, people are willing to pay for them. But labor also possesses a value of exchange, and people are willing to pay for it as well as for the material objects that constitute the globe and its inhabitants. Let it be observed that labor is essentially private property. It has a value, and the land has no more than a value.

Let it also be observed that the land is not essentially private property, and that naturally one man has as much right to the land as another.

Labor on the one hand, and land on the other, are susceptible of taxation.

The privileged classes, in the earlier stages of society, had all the land and all the labor. The lord was the lord not only of the land, but of the labor of those who were engaged in the useful arts of industry. In the course of time the serfs obtained a small portion of their rights, and towns were formed where the citizens could carry on their labor with a certain degree of advantage to themselves, and with a certain degree of emancipation from the licentious will of the lord. Taxation could consequently be on the land of the lord, or on the labor of the townsman, for all the townsman's capital was originally the produce of his labor.

Let it be observed, that when the land is taxed, no

man is taxed; for the land produces, according to the law of the Creator, more than the value of the labor expended on it, and on this account men are willing to pay a rent for land. But when the privileged classes had monopolized the land, they called it theirs in the same sense in which labor is supposed to belong to the laborer; and, although the absurdity of the proposition is sufficiently apparent, the laborer was glad enough to escape with even a small portion of his liberty, and to rejoice that he could call his life and his family his own.

But then the lords of the land were the rulers and the makers of the laws, and the imposers of taxation, and it was not reasonable to suppose that they should tax the land. The king required money, and various persons about kings in all ages require money, and of course the only choice in the matter of taxation is between labor and the land.

To tax labor, then, becomes a matter of the most palpable necessity, and those who have been divested of almost every single particle of earth or sea that could be of any benefit to them, must also be made to bear the burdens of the state, and to pay for the support of a government that was of little use to the community, and that only existed by the right of the strongest, or the consent of superstition.*

The principle of taxing labor is only a remnant of the serfdom of the darker ages, and it has been continued in this country by the ingenious device of what

* A bad government is of no use to the community *immediately*, but meditately and prospectively the most stringent despotism in the world is of the highest importance and of the greatest value. Man must apparently progress through centralization; and a bad government, provided it centralizes, is the foundation of after changes most beneficial to mankind. The

are termed indirect taxes, by which labor is taxed, although the laborer is only made acquainted with the fact by the distress that periodically oppresses him.

The man who is poisoned without his knowledge does not die the less certainly for his ignorance, and the people who are taxed do not suffer the less because the taxes happen to be imposed in such a manner that the unthinking and the ignorant do not perceive those taxes in the price they pay for almost every article of consumption. All the real harm is done to a country as effectually by indirect taxation, as if every penny were paid out of the day's wages to the tax-gatherer of the state. But the rulers know full well that if the tax-gatherer were to present himself at the pay-table of the laborer, at the counter of the shopman, at the office of the merchant, and at the ship of the seafaring carrier, the doom of labor taxation would be sealed, and the country would not tolerate so glaring an injustice. And the indirect system of taxation is employed, not that it prevents the community from suffering, but that it prevents the community from dwelling on the cause of their suffering, and thereby retards a revolution against the privileged classes.

Such are the circumstances that have led to the establishment of customs and excise; and the total and complete abolition of those two branches of interference is one of the necessary changes that must take place before this country can be free and before this

good part of the Russian government is its centralization. In the general history of man, it seems requisite that central monarchy should destroy the privileges of multiple aristocracy; and Russia is gradually effecting this great change. The sympathy manifested towards the Poles is questionable, inasmuch as the great majority of Poles were ruled by individual aristocrats instead of by laws.

country can enjoy that commercial liberty, without which a periodical crisis must necessarily be the lot of the laborer, the merchants and the manufacturer. It is true that the total abolition of the customs appears chimerical at present; yet, if we consider the history of the changes that have already taken place, and seize their abstract form (the only form that contains real instruction), we have sufficient ground to hope, not only for the abolition of every species of tax upon labor, but for the recovery of each man's natural property. So certainly as this country continues to progress, so certainly must every restraint be removed from every action that is not a crime; and the customs' laws can no more be perpetuated, if the present liberty of discussion continues, than restraints upon discussion could be perpetuated after men had learnt to think for themselves, and to form their convictions according to the evidence before them.

The Protestant creed introduced a very important change in the credence of the country in the matter of religion.

The Romanists always professed to slaughter men to the glory of God. The Protestants, on the contrary, abandoned the high ground of sacrifice to the Deity, and substituted the more rational idea of sacrifice to the King. The unfortunate Covenanter, who was shot or decapitated, was not an offering to the Deity, but an offering to the King; and the difference was of immense importance to the country, although of no particular consequence to the Covenanter. So soon as legislation for men's thoughts was conceived to be for man, and not for God, men began to inquire whether, after all, the King had really the right to legislate to such an extent. And as knowledge increased, they began to relax their principles a little,

and to think that the deprivation of civil privileges, would be punishment sufficient for the offence of thinking differently from the sect in power.

The modification still goes on, and measure after measure is abolished, until at last the professors of different creeds almost begin to think that they can inhabit the same country without persecuting each other on account of their religion.

The last remnant of this religious superstition that once played so prominent a part in Britain, is now to be found in the taxation of nonconformists; and the church-rates and the official distinction between the various sects are the last representatives of that system of legislation that lit the fires of Smithfield, and sent Claverhouse and his dragoons to murder the hill-side peasant and to torture the differently thinking Presbyterian.

But what is the principle that has so modified the laws of Britain? Whence comes it that men should have so singularly changed their opinions in the course of a century or two?

It is perfectly evident that justice does not vary from age to age. Justice is the same from the beginning of world to the time that man shall change his constitution.

An act of justice can no more alter its character than the diameter of the circle can alter its relation to the circumference. What was just yesterday is just to-day, was just a thousand years ago, and will be just a thousand years to come.

How then does it happen that so strange a modification should have come over the credence of our race, and how does it happen that men should legislate so differently.

The credence has changed with the acquisition of

knowledge, and the legislation has changed with the credence.

Men have discovered that legislators have no right to legislate for credences, and thus the last remnants of such legislation are obliged to appear under another name, and to assume a false guise that they may be allowed to continue a few years longer.

For the man animal, food is the first necessity; but for the man mental, credence according to evidence is the first correct law of his intellectual nature. Food is one of the conditions of existence; and, until it can be procured in tolerable quantity, and with some degree of certainty, a community cares little about the mind, and allows the question of free thought to remain in abeyance.

When a community begins to emerge from barbarism, and legislation assumes a definite form, everything is legislated for. Food, thought, speech, action, property, in all their various forms, are all made subject of enactment; and men thus endeavor to improve the world that God made, by passing laws to amend the order of nature. The first necessity for the community is to have some small opportunity of procuring food, and when the necessary conditions are obtained (which involve some degree of liberty), men turn their attention to other subjects, according to the character of their theological belief. The religious impulses of our nature require satisfaction, perhaps, before any other portion of the mental constitution; and as men must have some kind of theological credence, right or wrong, they believe anything rather than remain in doubt. And as, where there is no evidence, there can be no truth and no error, but mere arbitrary superstition, the state has generally established some form of credence by law, and committed the care of

the superstition to the priests. But there does happen to be a true religion as well as an indefinite number of superstitions; and, after the revival of learning, when the truth began to break on men's minds, that religion was not a matter of mere arbitrary church authority, but a real matter of truth and falsehood, in which life and death were involved, the Christianity of the Bible came into collision with the established superstitions of the Papal priesthood, and a struggle was commenced which began by the maximum of persecution, and ended, in this country at least, in the maximum of liberty of thought.

It must not be supposed, however, that a country is in the same circumstances before a law has been called into existance, and after its abolition. Before the law is enacted men are naturally free, but when the law has been abolished men are legally free. A country, arrived at complete freedom after the various transformations of superstition and injustice, is a very different thing from a country where legislation has only commenced. The actual laws that exist in both cases might perhaps be the same; but in the one case they are the stepping-stones to an indefinite series of legislative acts, and in the other case they are the permanent records of a nation's final judgment. England, before men legislated for thoughts, and England after men have legislated for thoughts, and abolished such legislation, is in very different circumstances; inasmuch as it may now be reckoned a matter of ascertained truth, that legislation for matters of belief is pre-eminently prejudicial, as well as unjust. And the probability of new legislation on the subject can scarcely be contemplated.

Where rulers govern by power, and not by the enlightened choice of the nation, they are a party op-

posed to the nation. On the one hand is the nation and the national interest; on the other hand is the government and the interest of the individuals connected with it. The more powers the rulers have, the less liberty the people have; and the more land and privilege the rulers have, the less wealth have the population. Now wealth and power are exactly what men are desirous of possessing; and as rulers are men, it is not to be wondered at that they dip their fingers into every man's dish, equitably or unequitably, and monopolize the best things that happen to be going. The land, of course, either in kind or in some other form, falls to the lot of the rulers and their coadjutors—the nobles and the priests. The cultivation of the land (the labor), instead of also falling to the lot of the privileged classes, becomes the portion of the people.

But excessive privileges are much easier maintained against a weak people than against a strong one; and as the people can only be strong by knowledge, virtue, and combination—knowledge, virtue, and combination are in little favor with despotic governments.

Political knowledge (that is, a knowledge of their rights and interests) is carefully excluded from the mass of the population; and as political knowledge grows out of discussion about social welfare, as well as out of the thoughtful toil of the author, both discussion and authorship are subjected to partial or total prohibition. The most frantic blasphemies will find a readier license for publication than a sober treatise on the public welfare; and a philosophical denial of all right and wrong whatever, will be more tolerable than an inquiry into the foundations of the rulers' privileges. The most infamously immoral production is less likely to be scrutinized than a dissertation on

political economy; and an association for murdering, torturing, and expatriating the population, would be more readily authorized than an association for forwarding the rights of the people.

Anything in the shape of superstition (that is, uninquiring credence) is esteemed proper enough; but the moment men begin to inquire and to seek reasons, that moment the government is alarmed, and that moment must means be put in operation to stop the course of knowledge.

The government must either give up its privileges, or keep the people in slavery with regard to expression of opinion; and the stringent laws of the continental powers, relative to every kind of political meeting, are no more than measures of precaution, analogous to those practised by the pirate who scuttles his prize (with its crew) as a measure conducing to his safety.*

The objects of a despotic government must necessarily be distinguished from its means. The objects are wealth and power; the means, tyranny and superstition. Tyranny is power without right, and superstition is credence without evidence. The governor of a country, in the earlier stage of legislation, is the strongest man in the country; and, by conversion, the strongest man in the country is the governor. Now, one strongest man, who has the opportunity of taking a thousand weaker men in detail, is stronger

* The pirate is rationally correct; that is, his act does conduce to his immediate safety, for dead men tell no tales, and sunk ships cannot appear in evidence. And despotic governors are also rationally correct; that is, an ignorant and superstitious population has less power and less desire for liberty than a population that thinks for itself, and has free opportunity of expression. The remote consequences, however, are sometimes overlooked. When the truth is discovered, the pirate is hanged, and the ruler guillotined.

than the whole thousand if he can prevent them from combining. This is the concise explanation of the theory of a despotic government. A noble, a chief, even a bishop, may become a sovereign, and remain so as long as he has power or dexterity to prevent the people from combining. As soon as they combine he is no longer the strongest, and his wealth as well as his power is in a fair way to depart. It therefore becomes a matter of serious consideration for him to discover and put in practice those means that tend to secure his power, and prevent his enemies (his subjects) from combining.

In the first place, he must have more wealth; and, as he cannot have it by his own honest industry he must have it by the industry of others, or by the monopoly of those natural objects which other men must possess as the conditions of their existence.

Land is the great source of wealth; forests and fisheries are also tolerable; mines and minerals are capable of yielding a revenue; and, in addition to these, comes the taxation of labor.

These sources of wealth, therefore, must be turned to account, and the governor of course does not neglect them. Wealth is power for the ruler, as knowledge is power for the people; and the more wealth the ruler has, the more power has he for taking advantage of his subjects. Wealth, therefore, is both a means and an end,—a means of getting more wealth and of getting more power. Wealth gives birth to a standing army, and a standing army gives birth to more power, as it enables the ruler to apply his principles more extensively and with greater security.

But if a people were to combine against any standing army that is likely to exist, the ruler would no longer be a ruler, and the army would no longer be an

army. It therefore becomes a matter of serious thought for the ruler to obviate the tendencies towards combination.

There are two or three kinds of combination.

The combination of national antipathy, which may exist where there is abundance of ignorance. Also religious combination, which by no means advances freedom as a matter of necessity. The Crusades* exhibited this kind of combination; also the union of the Presbyterians of Scotland, and the puritans of England. They had hold of the truth, and, though they had scarcely yet learnt to view it in its true light, they progressed immensely towards freedom. They did confound civil and religious liberty; but notwithstanding, it is to them, under God, that we owe the preservation of the cause of liberty in this country.

A third kind of combination is for the purpose of overthrowing an evil that presses on the feelings, thoughts and interests of men. This combination is a mere reaction against pressure.

But there is another kind of combination, and a far more important one for the welfare of the world: the combination of knowledge and reason. Knowledge

* Absurd as the Crusades were in themselves, they were of the highest value to Europe; in fact it seems that whatever the temporary evils attendant on any human condition, that condition was a phase of progress, calculated to leave society in a better state than it found it. This principle is applicable also to the first French Revolution. It was a fearful scene when viewed individually. But if we look to the condition of France before the revolution, and again after the revolution, we cannot deny that its effects were of the greatest value to the country. Those who attend merely to the revolution and its horrors, are like those who go to see a criminal executed without asking the reason of his execution, or inquiring into the reasonableness of the laws which demand his execution. The French Revolution was produced by the laws of nature. Who made those laws?

is credence based on sufficient evidence; and reason is the power of perceiving consequences, and inferring antecedents. Without reason man would only be a higher kind of ape; as it is, he is a spirit and an immortal.

Man has an intellect as well as a bodily frame, and this intellect has its laws and its requirements. Observation is its food, reason is its process of digestion, and truth is its circulating fluid, without which it degenerates and dies. Truth makes the mind strong, ignorance makes it weak, and error infects it with disease. Knowledge is not only power, it is strength—strength of the mind, health, and life. To obliterate this strength, therefore, is the object of the despotic ruler. If the people are strong, the despot must be weak; but the legitimate ruler is so much the stronger as the people are stronger. When the rulers and the nation are in opposite scales, the less weight the people have, the more easily are they outweighed; but when both are in the same scales, the heavier they both are the better for both, and the worse for those who are opposed to them. In a free country, where law was absolutely supreme and really equitable, every man would feel the ruler to be a portion of himself, and would lend his arm or his aid to further the ends of justice.

In a despotism, superstition takes the place of knowledge, and the fear of suffering helps to procure an unwilling obedience.

The ruler is the wolf, the people are the flock, and the lawyers and priests are the foxes who prepare the flock for slaughter.

When the priesthood lose their influence, an army must be resorted to, and physical tyranny and centralization must do the work of superstition. At all

hazards, the people must be kept down, or the game of despotism is lost.

Mere superstition, however, is insufficient to enslave a people that has commercial intercourse with other nations. So long as the country can be surrounded with a barrier, and free communication prevented, superstition may do its work tolerably well, and a nation may remain in much the same state for an indefinite period.* When, for a thousand years, the sun rises every day upon similar conditions, it is by no means wonderful that change should not take place. In the political as well as the physical world, the conditions must be changed before we can look for a change in the phenomena. Change the conditions, and some change or other will be exhibited in the consequent results. For those who have the land and the privilege, every change is dangerous; and the invariable tendency of the privileged classes to oppose change is only a prudent exercise of foresight.

One of the most important changes in the condition of a people is free intercourse with strangers. Interchange of thought and opinion takes place, information is given and received, new arts are learnt and communicated, and something analogous to a chemical effervescence takes place between the two people,

* We have only to look at Spain to see how effectually superstition eradicates even an aspiration after freedom. Let it be remembered that a few centuries since Spain was second to no country in Europe in the extent of her political power. What is she now, and what has superstition made her? "The masses care no more for a constitution than the Berber or Oriental; with them this thing of parchment is no reality, but a mere abstraction, which they neither understand nor estimate. The people do not want their laws to be changed, but to have them fairly administered. Their only idea of government is despotism."—*Ford's Spain*, p. 862.

who are thus mutually excited to a state of social ferment. But not only are nations stimulated by intercourse with others; it appears to be a law of animal development, that the mixture of races produces a higher and a better type than either of the originals, and the finest races are those in whose elements the original types have almost disappeared. Races of men may, at the same time, be so mingled as to produce a lower type, and this law also extends to the lower animals; but while two races, already low, may be injudiciously crossed, to the detriment of the progeny, there seems little reason for doubt that the intermixture of national blood, where the races are of a higher character, is conducive to the physical perfection of mankind. The races of western Europe, that now take the pre-eminence in the world, are complex, and the result of many amalgamations. The south of Britain, especially, which produces men probably inferior to none on the whole surface of the globe, is peopled by a race resulting from many tribes who successively invaded the shores, and left a greater or less impress on the character of the inhabitants. The Spaniard and the Frenchman are also the results of mixed blood; and, though the kingdom of Spain has sunk into insignificance from the effects of superstition and tyranny, the Spaniard is a high type of the human species, and only wants truth and freedom to enable him to play a distinguished part in the destinies of the world. When England and France were as superstitious and as enslaved as Spain, Spain was perhaps the most powerful kingdom in Europe: but since Spain did not progress in freedom, she has naturally sunk into every kind of licentiousness; and the Spanish race, with all its immorality and recklessness of bloodshed, is a living evidence of what kings

and priests can do with a nation, when the nation does not destroy their influence in time. Had Spain established freedom of thought, instead of torturing and expatriating her industrious inhabitants, she might now have been a second England, with wealth and power beyond any other continental country. Freedom of thought is now evolving in Spain; and if a moderate tyranny could be established, to consolidate the disjointed elements of the country, Spain might still progress. But freedom of thought is now necessary; and if any attempt be made to curtail it, the progress of revolution may go on for years and years, until worn out by anarchy, and the credences of the rising generation running counter to the old superstitions, some old adventurer may seize the reins of government, and exhibit Spain under an entirely new aspect. That the present rulers will continue is almost an impossibility.

Knowledge is credence based on sufficient evidence, and reason is the power of perceiving consequences, and of inferring antecedents. The combination of knowledge and reason is the great moving power destined to emancipate the world. It is the only ground of hope for the unprivileged classes, but, at the same time, it is a sure ground of hope; and the more rapidly knowledge increases, the more rapidly will its all-powerful influence be made apparent to the world. Correct credence is absolutely essential to the human race, before that race can know and work out its own wellbeing.

The elements of this correct credence are, 1st, The Bible. 2d, A correct view of the phenomena of material nature. 3d, A correct philosophy of the mental operations.

1st, The Bible. So far from the Bible being in

opposition to the reason of mankind, it is the great emancipator of the reason.

Independently of all considerations of a hereafter, the Bible has an eminent effect in regulating the conditions of men of this world.

The Bible strikes at the root of persecution, by removing the false credence on which it is based; it sanctions no persecution, but teaches men that they are made of one flesh, and that they are personally responsible to their Creator.

2d, A correct view of natural phenomena. In this two things are implied: 1st, A knowledge of natural phenomena (science); and, 2d, The attribution of those phenomena to their true cause. If God be the creator of the universe, God is also the physical governor of the universe; and as such we must regard the occurrences of nature as the results of the laws established by Him. And when once men shall really awake to the conviction, that the social evils of the community (poverty and want, with the accompaniments of crime, ignorance and disease) arise from an infringement of certain invariable laws, no more uncertain in their nature than those which regulate the fall of a stone or the motion of a planet, we may reasonably expect that men will bend their eye on the phenomenon, endeavor to ascertain the conditions and forces that result in good or evil, and thus to discover a natural science of society that may open a new era in the history of civilization. Induction is no less applicable to the phenomena of men than it is to the phenomena of matter.

So long as man takes the fact in nature, and seeks to assign a cause, he follows the true path; and that path is abstractly correct, however absurd may be the fancied explanation.

An endless variety of phenomena are constantly occurring around us, and these, by a law of our mental constitution, are referred to causes. These causes have ever played a most prominent part in the history of mankind, and the fancy has ever thrown around them that mysterious mantle of the imagination by which they were clothed with personality. From necessary forms of rational thought, they become transfigured into conscious existences, that willed and acted for themselves and produced the multifarious phenomena of nature. The world was filled with half material spirits, demons and demigods, fates, furies, destinies, and all vague mythologies of mysterious influences.

But it was reserved for the corruption of Christianity to throw the darkest shade. It is said that "the shadow is nowhere so dark as immediately under the lamp." Piety died away and theology took her place. The wisdom that is from above is not a creed, but a principle of life imbued with truth; and when the Church forgot the life, the truth vanished from the symbol and left the dead remains of unspiritual knowledge. The shadows were dark before, but now was the night of degradation. Demons and devils stared from out the ordinary phenomena of nature; and the multitude of sorcerers who were immolated in the Middle Ages, were as much the victims of nature misinterpreted, as the martyr Christians were the victims of a false theology.*

* Then, too, men fought because it was their trade. Patriotism, that most pure and most holy of all man's natural sentiments, was disbanded save with the peasant cultivators of the soil, who still could fight for their homes like the tiger for his lair. A country where there is no patriotism is not safe for a day. Patriotism is a country's true strength; for where there is no patriotism there is no bond of union.

But day broke at last, and nature was emancipated from the mystic folds of superstition. The great turning-point of modern times was, when the doctrine of constant repetition of similar phenomena in similar conditions was substituted for the dread of unseen, and too often malevolent, agency.

Man learned at last to bend his eye on the phenomenon, accurately to observe the conditions, and accurately to measure the change. Physical truth was the result of this operation, so simple, now we know it, yet of such vast importance to the welfare of the world. Superstition here received its blow of death; and, just in proportion as the inductive philosophy (in physical science) was received and cultivated, so was man emancipated from the terrors of unseen agency, and the phenomena of nature were fixed on a stable basis that invited man constantly to further inquiry.

But what has become of the causes?

The causes were now no longer beings, but the laws by which the one God carries on the government of the material world. But has this view of nature a direct bearing on the political condition of mankind? No doubt of it whatever. Those who have advocated the utilitarian theory are true benefactors to their country; and, though we may take occasion to advert to the cases in which that theory has been carried altogether out of its legitimate province, we of course accept it to its utmost extent in those matters that come within its range. But what is the utilitarian theory, and what is its connection with inductive philosophy?

Let us suppose men legislating on a theological principle (no matter what), and carrying out their laws by force. Let us suppose an inductive philosopher beginning at the effects of these laws, carefully col-

lecting the statistics of the things he can observe, and arranging them into an exhibition of facts. Let us suppose that these facts show the results of the legislation to have been eminently detrimental to the great body of the population. Suppose he publishes these details. Of course those who legislate on a theological principle care nothing about consequences; for if the principle be correct, the legislation is a duty at all hazards. Now, what is to be done? Of course, if the populace are not quite so certain about the principle as the legislators are, they might begin to suspect a mistake in the rulers' method of proceeding, and perhaps they might weigh the statistics against the theology, and give the preference to the former. This is very likely. Now, what course have the rulers? Either to abandon their legislation, or to expel the philosopher, and prevent all further inquiries of the kind. But suppose the inductive mode of judging of legislative acts should happen to procure free course, it is quite impossible that facts, mere facts, should not tell on the country in the long run, and that reasonings upon those facts should not spring up in every man's mind, and cause him to throw all his weight into every change in which he could see his own, and the interest of his fellows involved.

But suppose a new light were to break upon the nation. Suppose men should happen to reflect that facts come from the operations of the laws of God, and suppose the thought should strike them that God is a benevolent and a just God—that he made a good world, gave it good laws, and that social evils sprang from man's injustice to his fellow, and from the wrong way in which things have been divided. Suppose the idea should go abroad that God is no respecter of persons, but that perhaps the welfare of a peasant is of

as much value in the eyes of Him who doeth all things well, as the welfare of a king. Now, suppose to these reflections were joined another or two, that God made man's reason, and made man to hate pain and flee from it; and also that man's nature obliges him to live in society, and that societies may make mistakes, as the child does who puts his finger into the flame, and that the pain is to teach him to beware in future. Were such notions to go abroad, it is perfectly evident that the inductive philosophy, when it found out evils and suffering attending legislative acts, would come backed with the authority of Him who made the laws of nature, and it would lead to the belief that the welfare of the great masses of the population was never sacrificed to procure the wealth of the few, without God's displeasure being always made manifest in the suffering that ensued. Not that this suffering was a miraculous interference, but the result of the ordinary laws which God has made for the government of the world.

Suppose, however, one more principle should be admitted, namely, that "that which is just is beneficial, and for the good of the greatest number." Suppose men should reflect that induction requires time and knowledge before it can be brought to perfection, and that God endowed man with an *à priori* principle of justice, to enable him to steer clear of injuring his fellow, even where the inductive evidence should not be at hand. Suppose the results of this justice and of this induction should happen to turn out always and invariably coincident, and although pursuing different paths to reach the same end, yet the end arrived at never was different.

Were all this admitted, it is plain that the inductive method of examining the condition of the country

would have a most direct and most powerful influence on the legislation of the country. Where suffering was considered not the mere accident of chance, nor the work of a malevolent spirit, but the voice of a just and benevolent God telling men to amend the order of society, and to return to those elementary principles of justice that He had implanted in their mind—surely we can see that the progress of this nation must be very different from the progress of that nation from which inductive philosophy was banished, and where men legislated for themselves and pretended to be legislating for God.

3d, A correct philosophy of the mental operations.

Whenever we approach what is termed metaphysical philosophy, we feel that we approach a quagmire, over which a dense mist seems to hold its perpetual habitation. If we attempt to advance, two ultimate and hitherto impassable objects present themselves to view. On the one hand is the bottomless pit of scepticism, and on the other is the commanding but inaccessible height of absolute truth.

Between scepticism on the one hand, and the dogmatism of unsupported faith on the other, philosophy has slowly swayed backwards and forwards, leaving man as little farther advanced in ontology as he was five hundred, or a thousand, or two thousand years since.

To suppose, however, that philosophy is the useless jargon that some writers appear desirous of representing, because it has failed to solve the great problem, namely, “How can objective existence be rationally substantiated?” is surely to look at history with only one eye.

Grant that scepticism in philosophy is the ultimate result of all investigation; let us only be consistent,

and make that scepticism universal, and the bugbear of scepticism disappears forever. Let us write a plus or a minus, a sign positive or a sign negative, before all our knowledge, and what difference can it possibly make?—knowledge remains the same in all its relative proportions; and all that man has really ascertained to be true, remains as permanently stable, and as really capable of application, as if ten thousand syllogisms had proven that knowledge was truth, and that the axiomatic credence of mankind was really veracious. Scepticism, whatever be its danger, is only dangerous when partially applied. When one man shall have demonstrated to another man his own existence (and the most sceptical of sceptics admits the existence of the *me*), it will then be time to substantiate objective existence, by a process of proof that can have no difficulties, when once the proof of the one *me* is furnished to the other. If we will be sceptics, let us be consistent; and let us write our sign negative, not merely before objective knowledge, but before the existence of that *me*, whose existence is absolutely as incapable of every approach to rational proof as is the existence of an external world.

When, however, we take the existence of the *me* for granted, and then insist that other objective existence should produce a proof of which it is incapable, our scepticism is not only dangerous but fatal. Rational proof there is none, either in the one case or the other; for the *me* is as really objective to all our consciousness, as is matter or universal mind. We are conscious of mental phenomena alone; and the *me* is as far removed from immediate appreciation, as is any other substantive existence that our race admits with persevering universality. Let us only make scepticism (philosophic scepticism), absolutely universal, and the

foundations of real knowledge are laid anew, scepticism being buried in a grave of its own digging.

For ourselves, we believe that scepticism may be fairly met, and fairly vanquished by the most strict rules of logic. Its stronghold is in the ambiguity of terms, and in the use of terms which it has no logical right to use. Scepticism says, "You have no proof for the objective truth of your subjective convictions." We deny the fact, and allege that an argument based on the calculation of probabilities would establish, beyond the smallest possibility of doubt, the objective veracity of the subjective laws of reason. The mathematical sciences are, every one of them,—namely, arithmetic, algebra, geometry, and statics, purely subjective; every one of their primary propositions is an axiomatic truth taken for granted, self-evident, incapable of question, purely abstract, and that does not pronounce on the real existence of any concrete reality whatever. Now how comes it, that when these subjective sciences are applied to matter, an entity with which they have nothing to do, they are invariably as correct as when merely contemplated by the reason? How, if the subjective convictions and subjective processes of the reason are not correct, can an astronomer predict the return of a comet?—and the comet does return, to other men's perceptions, years after he is dead. Scepticism is the greatest imposition that ever fooled a man's reason, yet it must be fairly met.

Never, perhaps, was the absence of a definition productive of so much fruitless toil, as when men set to work on philosophy. What does a man propose to expound when he teaches philosophy? For a long period philosophy was ontology; that is, the knowledge of being, entirely and exclusively objective in its char-

acter, entirely and exclusively subjective in its means of operation. That is, men endeavored to substantiate both the reality and the form of the universe in their own minds, without the connecting link, evidence, that renders one form of thought knowledge. There was no evidence, therefore there was no knowledge. With such a system the abstract sciences alone are possible, as in them the evidence is subjective, and supplied by the rational constitution of the mind.

The Baconian philosophy broke up ontology by supplying the connecting link that must unite the object and the subject. That link was evidence, and that evidence was only possible by means of observation. Philosophy now separated into two parts—metaphysics and science, which latter was the new philosophy that arose from the new method of founding knowledge on evidence.

The new philosophy has advanced with wonderful strides, enlightening man's intellect, and dispersing innumerable benefits, which reproduce themselves in an infinity of forms, and hold out hopes of great and permanent advantage to our race. The old philosophy remains much where it was as regards its nature, but in a very different position as to the extent of the ground it occupies.

At one period the method of making science without evidence was universal. It was applied to physics as well as to metaphysics, and its domain was supposed to extend over everything that could become the subject of human knowledge. It has now been driven from every part of that region that has been occupied by positive science.

Can nothing be learned from this fact? We think that something can, and it is this—That philosophy, after retrograding from every region of thought to

which man may apply his attention, shall at last resolve itself into the science of human thought, and pronounce nothing whatever on any subject that is not merely and exclusively human thought. If we consider knowledge, we shall find that it implies three things, the object (that is, the universe); the subject (that is, the human mind); and the connecting link between them, that is, evidence. Now, if we consider that philosophy has abandoned one portion after another of the object, just in proportion as positive science has occupied that portion, we can see that, if the process continues, the whole of the object must ultimately be abandoned, and the subject alone become the object of contemplation. And if so, then will philosophy teach only psychology, taking that term extensively to signify mental science.

The multitude, in all ages, and in all places, have admitted the existence of the mind, the existence of the external world, and the existence of Deity. These appear to be the common and general groundwork of human credence and human action. The multitude believed, and acted on their belief, taking the three great facts we have mentioned as the most common and ordinary truths, without which the whole economy of thought must be overturned, and laid in inextricable confusion.

The philosophers, however, endeavored to give a rational explanation of the theory of human credence. Their object was not to accept these great facts, and thence to proceed to specific knowledge, but to lay anew the rational evidence on which these facts themselves were to be admitted.

But before man can reason, three substantives must be taken for granted, and two propositions must also be given, involving those three substantives as the terms

or he cannot by any possibility arrive at a proposition established by rational, that is, by logical proof. Let men therefore pursue their inquiry as far back as the most subtle intellect can possibly reach, there must necessarily be found at the bottom of all real or of all hypothetical reasoning, three substantives and two propositions, which, if accepted, may lead to real knowledge, and, if rejected, must land us without further difficulty in scepticism, absolutely universal.

Such being the case, we may unhesitatingly assert, that at the bottom of all knowledge whatever there must be found some substantive existences absolutely incapable of rational substantiation, and some propositions absolutely incapable of rational demonstration. Without these it is impossible for man to reason.

The specific difference, then, between real knowledge and philosophy appears to be this:—Real knowledge, or positive science, accepts the ordinary belief of the multitude; and, pursuing it forwards, endeavors to determine its limitations, becoming at every step less and less general. Philosophy, on the contrary, commencing at the ordinary belief of the multitude, pursues its course backwards, endeavoring at every step to become more and more general. The ultimate termination of this course must ever necessarily be, either to accept some propositions as primary and unproven, or to maintain a consistent scepticism, which absolutely obliterates the possibility of rational knowledge.

The geometrician, for instance, accepts space, without the smallest inquiry into its nature. His object is to limit, define, and exhibit the relations of spaces. The sister substantive of space, namely time, is also accepted by the man of science, whose only object is to measure it accurately—that is, definitely to determine the limitations of its portions. The physical

sciences, again, accept matter; and without the smallest speculation as to what matter really is, they each, in their several branches, endeavor to determine definitely its various forms, and accurately to specify its manifestations. Philosophy, on the contrary, endeavors to go backwards from the ordinary credence, and to furnish some explanation as to what matter is or is not, for some have attempted to obliterate it altogether.

The two substantives, space and matter, are sufficient for our purpose. Positive science accepting space, and pursuing the inquiry forwards—investigating first the forms of spaces, and then the necessary relations that exist between those forms—furnishes us with geometry. While by accepting matter, and inquiring only into the forms of its manifestation, and the relations that are observed to exist between those forms, we are, by the exercise of the human reason, at last presented with the sciences of astronomy, mechanics, chemistry, physiology, etc.

What has philosophy to place in the opposite scale? After a thousand years of speculation as to whether matter be a substance or a shadow, an existence real or ideal, not one single hair's breadth of progress towards its determination has ever been made. Every discussion as to the nature of matter or of space may be raised to-day as well as two thousand years ago.

We conceive, then, that the moment at which philosophy wandered and went astray was, when it attempted to discuss the objective truth or falsehood of the primary credences or convictions of mankind. These primary convictions, in their general form, are at the bottom of all human knowledge; but whether human knowledge have or have not an external, real, and objective counterpart, which would remain if man

and man's intellect were annihilated, neither philosophy nor any other natural method can possibly determine. Whether the mental propositions which constitute knowledge coincide with actual and external realities is a matter, not of knowledge, which can be rationally substantiated, but of primary, unproven, and unprovable credence.

Philosophy can no longer attempt to pronounce *à priori* upon what is or what is not, but must confine itself exclusively to thought and to that alone. The true province of philosophy is not to inquire into the truth or falsehood of the primary convictions of the intellect, but to observe and record what those primary convictions are, to enumerate them, to determine the forms of their manifestations, and to pursue with regard to human thought the same kind of inquiry that the mathematical sciences pursue with regard to numbers, quantities, and spaces, and more nearly still, the same kind of inquiry that the physical sciences pursue with regard to matter and its manifestations.

Be the mind as complex as it may, it could of itself originate not one single iota of knowledge, unless the substantive groundwork of that knowledge were furnished to it from without. Observation, psychological or sensational, can alone furnish us with a fact, and a fact in one form or other must lie at the bottom of every chain of reasoning, not purely hypothetical. The primary matter of knowledge, whether relating to the *me* or the *not me*, must be derived exclusively from observation and never can by any possibility be more than guessed at by the mere metaphysician. The form of knowledge and not the matter is the true object of philosophy.

We conclude, then, our argument with regard to the combination of knowledge and reason. We mean not

that men must combine knowledge and reason, but that the great masses of the unprivileged classes must combine together on the same knowledge and on the same principles, that they have rationally deduced from that knowledge. It has been said, that "for men to be free, it is sufficient that they will it;" never was there a greater mistake, or one so utterly at variance with the great facts of history. Perhaps no sentiment is stronger in the human breast than the love of liberty. For this men have panted, prayed, fought, struggled, rebelled, and endured every kind of hardship, and every kind of cruelty. And yet they are not free. To be free, it is first necessary that men should know wherein true freedom consists; namely, in the absolute supremacy of equal and impartial law, made without respect of persons or classes, and administered with uprightness and regularity. Nor is this all. True freedom is the very highest point of political civilization; and to suppose that mere will can ever lead to that point, is to suppose that men may overleap the conditions of their nature, and reach the goal without the struggles of the race. True freedom, however simple in its theory, is the highest, and probably the most complex, form of combined society. It is the whole body of society acting on the principles of knowledge, and carrying truth into practical operation. Will can never achieve this. It is the result and ultimate end of a great progress, which makes its way with knowledge, sometimes advancing with peaceful steps, sometimes overturning the barriers that stand in the way amid the din of revolution. It is the condition of society where will is excluded, and law is made on an objective reason, which convinces man's judgment that it is equitable. It is the condition first to be defined in its abstract form by the man of thought, and then

to be striven for by the mass of the population. A condition that supposes great advancement and infinite benefit to mankind, but a condition that must be purchased, and purchased only on those terms which are prescribed by the laws of man's constitution.

There are three conditions of society involving a cause on the one hand, and an effect on the other.

The causes are Knowledge, Superstition, Infidelity. The effects Freedom, Despotism, Anarchy.

Such are the conditions of our nature. Man may make his election of the cause, but God has determined the character of the consequent.

No fact stands out more prominently from the condition of the various nations, or from their history, than that those conditions, and the great actions of men in the figure of society, depend upon their credences; that is, on the convictions of their intellect; that is, on the propositions they hold to be true. What makes one nation press ardently forward in the pursuit of liberty, while another sits dead and stupid under the iron rule of the despot? Thought, mere thought, impalpable and invisible thought, a something which can neither be seen, felt, nor handled; but which fixes man's destiny, raising him if correct to the dignity and energy of freeman, dooming him if erroneous to vice, degradation, and slavery. The history of the world has to be re-written on a new principle, and this unseen element has to be exhibited as the cause of the condition of the nations. Climate, circumstance, and race, may all go for something or for much; but, far more influential than either, is credence. Sooner or later men must learn the great fact, that the social and political condition of a nation is absolutely dependent on that nation's credence. Correct credence is knowledge, and knowledge alone is capable of re-

generating the political condition of mankind. Change the credence of a nation, and you change the whole current of its future progress.

We now turn to the use of combination. There are certain evils which belong to the race of mankind, and which afflict humanity more or less in every quarter of the globe. In the existence of these evils is to be found the reason of combination; and the object of combination is to remove as much as possible, such of them as affect the political condition of men, or the condition of men in society.

The first great master evil is that which causes man to prefer the gratification of passion to the enlightened and rational exercise of his natural faculties. Whatever view may be taken of the theological question of natural depravity, we hold it a historical fact of the very first magnitude, and of the most indubitable veracity, that the human race, as such, has always, and in every known region of the earth, “done the things which it ought not to have done, and left undone the things which it ought to have done.” With regard to man’s nature, we shall enter into no disputation; but, with regard to men’s actions, we view them through the common medium of history, and we hesitate not to see the practice of injustice more or less prevalent in every country of the earth, and, at the same time, to accept that explanation of the fact which is furnished in such plain terms by the words of divine revelation. History informs us that the actions of men are wicked; and surely there can be no absurdity in giving credence to Scripture, when it informs us that their hearts are so likewise. With the depravity of the heart, politics has no concern; but, so soon as that depravity comes to manifest itself in action, and to appear in the form of fraud or violence, the necessity of a sys-

tem of politics is immediately substantiated. Men are wicked, and therefore inclined to do wrong; but they are also rational, and may combine systematically to prevent the wrong from being done.

1st, The progress of mankind is a progress from ignorance, error, and superstition, toward knowledge.

2d, Governments being established in the earlier stages of society—that is, during the reign of ignorance, error, and superstition—have always, and in every known case, been more or less despotic; that is, have systematically assumed powers to which they were not justly entitled.

3d, The progress of political society is a progress in which these unjust powers have been gradually curtailed and abolished, in proportion as the nation has progressed from ignorance and superstition, and advanced towards knowledge.

The use, then, of the combination of knowledge and reason, is (not to combine against individual injustice, this being the province of the government, but) to reduce the powers of the government and the laws of the country within those bounds of justice beyond which they cannot be other than despotic.

It is the combination of the nation, or of the enlightened portion of the nation, against the laws of the nation, and against the unjust powers of the rulers.

Liberty is advanced not by the warfare of one nation against another nation, but by the warfare (physical or moral) of the unprivileged classes against the unjust laws, and against the unjust privileges that prevail within the nation itself; and this warfare can only be carried on efficiently by the mass of the population combining to extort those measures that have been theoretically shown to be right, or those measures that on good grounds are presumed to be beneficial.

When we look back on the history of England or of any other country that has made considerable progress, we see that all the great changes that have taken place in the political condition of the population have been preceded by changes in the theoretic credence of the population, and that the amended order of society has resulted directly from a new and more correct order of thought. And we may also see that these beneficial changes have seldom, if ever, originated with the rulers themselves, but have been extorted from them sometimes by force, and sometimes by the moral influence that the man in the right has over the man in the wrong.

Without alluding to the explosion of the “divine right of kings,” etc. (which enabled rulers to practice flagrant iniquities without being brought to judicial trial), we may refer to two modern instances of the combination of knowledge and reason, by which the people of Britain obtained changes of vast extent, by a moral power which overcame the will of the rulers and of the privileged orders, who were linked to support the abuses. We refer to the emancipation of the negroes, and to the repeal of the corn-laws.

The laws of Great Britain declared that it was lawful for one man to possess another man as his property; and this principle was carried into practical operation by the seizure and reduction to slavery of vast numbers of Africans.

In this negro slavery we have a vast system of fraud and violence, established and continued by authority of the British government; that is, we have the power which has been conferred on the government for the purpose of preventing violence and fraud, turned altogether away from its legitimate exercise, and made the instrument of supporting a system of glaring in-

justice and flagrant iniquity. We have that greatest of all political evils, injustice, established and maintained by law. And what was it that abolished negro slavery? It was the moral influence of knowledge, reason, and religion. The trade had been sanctioned by long use; the interests of the wealthy and powerful were linked to maintain it; the laws of the empire had declared it legitimate, and the government was opposed to its abolition. More than this, not one single man who had the means and the opportunity to make himself heard on behalf of the negro, had one farthing of pecuniary interest in procuring the negro's emancipation.

What, then, were the motives and the means that led to so great a political change as the emancipation of a race from slavery?

First, Certain individuals learnt to think aright on the subject, and to give utterance to their thoughts. The battle was then commenced. On the one hand was reason, involving the principles of natural equity, and on the other was the despotism of the law, the power of the government, and the pecuniary interests of the wealthy and influential.

Sooner or later correct thought makes its way, and the more rapidly and surely, the more a nation has abandoned superstition.

The theoretic argument or credence adopted by the advocates of liberty was, "That man is made free by God, and can never be made rightfully a slave by man." The argument in its most essential character was one of mere justice, not of economical benefit or prejudice, profit or loss. A moral agitation was commenced, the few were transformed into the many, and the progress of opinion (of credence) was such, that every possible argument that could be adduced on the

opposite side was brought forth from the lying chambers of selfishness. Everything in the shape of an argument, everything that could be made to pass for one, though halt, lame, or blind, was pressed into the service of casuistry, for the purpose of perpetuating injustice.

The theoretic credence, however, gained ground, and was powerfully aided by a more accurate knowledge of the enormities that Britons practised on Africans under shelter of British law. Authentic information was obtained and disseminated, and at last a great combination of knowledge and reason was brought to bear against the iniquity. Political justice, however, is a plant of slow growth; and years of debate, of contest between truth and falsehood, were necessary, before even the trading in human blood, the buying and selling of man, who was made in the image of the Creator, ceased to receive the sanction of the most enlightened and freest state in the world. And here we cannot fail to remark one circumstance that has almost invariably accompanied every political change which had for its object the destruction of an injustice. We mean the outcry about the evils that would follow. No sooner has any one, more enlightened or more impartial than his neighbors, insisted on an act of justice (which, after all, let it never be forgotten, is only the refraining from injustice), than all the evils in the category are immediately prognosticated, as if the doing of God's will were to let loose hell to ravage the earth.

When the emancipation of the African was spoken of, and when the nation of Britain appeared to be taking into serious consideration the rightfulness of abolishing slavery, what tremendous evils were to follow! Trade was to be ruined, commerce was almost to cease, and manufacturers were to be bankrupts. Worse

than all, private property was to be invaded (property in human flesh), the rights of planters sacrificed to the speculative notions of fanatics, and the British government was to commit an act that would forever deprive it of the confidence of British subjects. These evils at home were, of course, to be accompanied by others abroad much more tremendous. The West India islands were, of course, to be ruined past all possible hope of recovery; the blacks were to insurge and to destroy the white population; a moral hurricane, ten times more dreadful than the winds of heaven, was to sweep across the Caribbean Sea; blood was to flow like water; the emancipated slave was to celebrate the first moment of his liberty with rape, rapine, and murder; evils unheard of and inconceivable were to astonish the earth; the very heavens were to fall. And why? Because British subjects were no longer to be permitted by British law to hold their fellow men in slavery on British ground.

The law was a positive enactment armed with power, and the moment the law ceased to exist the negro was emancipated, not by the law, but by nature. The law may make a slave, but it is beyond the power of the law to make a freeman. The only question that can ever be legitimately taken into consideration, with regard to slavery, is immediate and total abolition, and so of all similar cases where injustice is established or systematically perpetuated by law.

The people of Great Britain were taxed by force for the purpose of paying the planters for their slaves. Theoretically, the Commons imposed the taxation on themselves; but nine-tenths of the population have nothing to do with the election of members of parliament, and so far as they were concerned, the taxation was *ab extra*—forced on them by a government which

they had no voice in electing. We maintain that this act was one of downright injustice and oppression, whatever may be said of its magnanimity.

The planters knew perfectly well that they never had a moral right to the slaves, and consequently they could have no moral claim to compensation. Now, the slave-laws were not enacted by this generation, and it is admitted that those who enacted them had no possible right to do so. The payment of the twenty millions, therefore, resolved itself into this, "The law of Britain will not cease to lend its aid and its arm to perpetuate slavery, unless the people of Britain pay an immense sum to the planters." The only course that was really legitimate was for the government of Britain to declare that it had no possible right to make or keep men slaves, and at once to expunge the statutes, letting the planters take their chance, at the same time protecting the negroes, as British subjects, born on British ground. It was a just, and as the world goes, a glorious thing for Britain to abolish slavery as it did; but most certainly the laboring man of England, who pays five per cent. on his tea, sugar, and tobacco, to pay the planters, is as surely oppressed and defrauded as was the negro, although not to the same extent. No man in the world, and no association in the world, could ever have an equitable right to tax a laborer for the purpose of remunerating a man-robber; and although the measure is now passed and done with, we very much question whether some analogous cases will not be cleared up by the mass of the nation ere many years pass over the heads of Englishmen. When the question of landed property comes to a definite discussion, there may be little thought of compensation.

The other instance of a great and successful com-

bination, in which knowledge and reason triumphed over the law, the government, and the privileged classes of the country, was recently exhibited in the repeal of the corn-laws.

The case of the corn-laws appears to have been this.

The farmer, in taking a farm, has three great subjects to consider, 1st, The quantity of produce. 2d, The probable price of produce. 3d, Amount of rent.

The first question which the would-be farmer has to answer, is, "Can he make a profit by taking land from the landowner, and selling corn to the consumer?" A given farm is estimated to produce a certain average quantity of grain. This quantity is the first item to be considered, as it is the basis of all future calculation. A certain portion of this quantity is requisite for consumption, and the remainder is marketable. The marketable portion, being the real merchandise which the farmer buys and retails again, must always be assumed at a certain value in the terms of the price paid for it. Whatever price the farmer pays for his marketable corn, he must expect, on the first principle of commerce, to receive a larger price (in the same terms) from the consumer. This larger price is the whole ultimate object of the farmer; and provided it is sufficient he is satisfied.

This then appears to have been the essence of the corn-laws. At the price at which corn would be sold in the English market, provided that market were open to all the world, the farmer could only pay a certain rent for land; but, provided all foreign competition was excluded up to a given point, the farmer could afford to pay a much higher rent for land, and yet derive the same real profit. The farmer was deluded into the idea of obtaining a high price for corn, and naturally gave, or stipulated to give, a high price for

land. The evil was unseen in its real malignity, until the abundant harvests of 1835 and 1836. The farmers were then reduced to sell at a natural price, while they had to pay a taxation rent, and of course they felt the weight of that system of legislation which attempted to amend the order of Providence, and on which, with all its nice adjustments, the landed legislators had descended so wisely.

The low price of corn at that period let the manufacturers into a secret; they obtained great sums of money, and with the money obtained what was of more value to the country—they obtained knowledge. They were taught that their commercial prosperity depended, in a great measure, on the low price of corn in Britain; and a very cursory consideration may explain how this happens. Let us suppose that there are five millions of the laboring population who have a gross income of from 10s. or 12s. to 30s. or 40s. per week. The laborer, out of his income, has to provide the three great requisites—food, shelter, and raiment; and, even at the best and most prosperous of times, his earnings are not much more than sufficient to procure these in decent abundance. Let us suppose that wheat is at 40s. per quarter, and that a laborer's family consumes 4s. worth of bread per week. He then has the remainder of his week's income to dispose of in the purchase of his other requisites. But let wheat rise to 80s. per quarter, and he must then expend 8s. per week for the same quantity of bread that he previously purchased for 4s. We have here a difference of 4s. per week; and the question is, What does the laborer do with those 4s. when bread is cheap? The answer is very simple—he spends it with the manufacturer. The laborer is at ease in his circumstances because he has this little revenue of 4s. a week to come and go on. It

is true, he must lay it out carefully ; but then how different to have it to think about, instead of having it screwed out of him by a crying pressure for food ! When he has it, he feels himself a free man, he has a new social and domestic existence, he is a buyer from choice, not from necessity ; and the family deliberations as to how it shall be spent, give a new interest to the hours he spends at home. All goes on merrily, and old England is worth all the countries under the sun.

Let us take even a moderate estimate of this 4s. a week, and we shall see how vast a sum it amounts to in the course of a year. Suppose that five millions have it to spend, and that those five millions spend £10 with the manufacturers. Fifty millions sterling arises from the difference in the price of corn ! Had the corn-laws operated according to the intentions of land-proprietors, and kept wheat at 80s. in the year 1836, there can be no doubt whatever that they would have deprived the laboring population of fifty millions worth of goods, and the manufacturers of fifty millions worth of sales, as directly as if those fifty millions had been wrested by violence from the laborer ; but this is one of the facts which the indirect system of taxation is employed to conceal.

The repeal of the corn-laws was effected by a great combination of knowledge and reason. Certain individuals found that their lawful interests were seriously injured by the interference of the enactments, and they resolved to make an effort for the abolition of those enactments. Of themselves they were utterly powerless, and all their individual exertions would have been ineffectual to achieve their end. They had, however, knowledge and reason on their side ; that is, they were in possession of certain facts, which led by necessary inference to the conclusion, that the corn-laws were eminently

prejudicial in their operation, and that therefore the corn-laws should no longer be allowed to exist. Conscious that they had truth on their side, they came fearlessly before the nation, and staked their cause on the power of truth to convince the mass of the population. They lectured, and published, and spoke, and argued, all for one specific end; namely, to communicate knowledge to the nation, and thereby to make the nation change its credence on the subject of the corn-laws. The truth gradually prevailed; that is, was generally disseminated; that is, the same knowledge was received by a larger number of individuals, who naturally drew the same necessary inference. A great combination was formed, such as must ever remain one of the historic glories of Britain and of Britons. It was essentially a combination of knowledge and reason; and well-grounded argument was the only weapon with which it maintained the contest. Far more was involved than a mere change in the economical laws of the kingdom; it was a contest between the two great classes of British society—the unprivileged laborers and the privileged landowners. The privileged classes, almost to a man, were against the change; and they also, on their side, endeavored to establish a combination—a combination of class interest, in which the only available argument was the pecuniary interest of the order. The exertions made by the anti-corn-law party to convince the judgment of the nation were prodigious and never had any political agitation so much the appearance of instructing, and so little the appearance of exciting the passions. Instead of the vague harangues of noisy and designing demagogues, there was the sober communication of information which would have been interesting and instructive, even had it been altogether unconnected with the great practical conse-

quence. The nation was convinced at last; and notwithstanding all the influence of the aristocracy, and all the unwillingness of the Government, the laws were repealed, and, as there is every reason to suppose, abolished forever.

Both the slave-laws and the corn-laws were positive enactments to restrain and diminish the natural liberty of men who had infringed no law of equity, and who had in no respect injured their fellow-men by force, fraud, or licentiousness. The abolition of those laws, therefore, was only to allow things to remain as they were established by nature; and when the world discovers that God has constituted nature aright, men will have arrived at the first and greatest principle of social science.

The legislators of the country were, in their private capacity, extensively interested in the maintenance of the unjust laws; and thus, in opposing their repeal, were using their official influence for their own personal advantage to the eminent detriment of their fellow-subjects.

The abolition of the slave- and corn-laws was only attained after a long and arduous struggle; the legislature of Great Britain, so far from taking the initiative in their repeal, offered every possible opposition to the wishes of the nation; and it was only when the pressure from without became so imperative that further resistance might have been dangerous, that the deliberative assembly of the freest state in the world, declared that it was not a crime for a man with a dark skin to enjoy natural freedom, or for a trader to import corn without being subject to a tax so enormous, that it usually operated as a prohibition.

The slave- and corn-laws were at last repealed, by a process which we doubt not will ultimately achieve the

repeal of every law which restricts or prohibits actions not naturally criminal—the wiser and better part of the nation combined against the legislature. On the one hand were knowledge, reason, and religion; on the other, prescriptive privilege, and the will of the legislator. The abolition of slavery was a question of justice; the abolition of the corn-laws, a question of benefit. The main argument advanced against slavery was that it was unjust; the main argument advanced against the corn-laws was that they were prejudicial to the country.

The argument of justice proceeds upon the principle that certain actions may not be done, whatever be their consequences. The argument of benefit assumes that the action itself is indifferent; that is, that it has not in itself any such moral character as will enable us to pronounce at once, whether it ought or ought not to be done.

History teaches us, that it is not sufficient for men to know that an action or an enactment is unjust to induce them to abandon the action, or to abolish the enactment; for this they seldom do until the evidence of the evil fruits of the injustice are so superabundant, that no mere sophism can be longer held as an excuse. The argument of justice, instead of being the most practically influential, as it is the most morally valid, is seldom of avail until backed by a knowledge of the economical evils that never in any one case fail to accompany injustice; and though the voice of God, and the voice of universal reason may ever be heard proclaiming, “Do not unto others as ye would not that others should do unto you,” it is not until some summation of evil consequences has convinced men of their error, that they abandon their course of lawless selfishness, and allow the constitution of society to remain

on the natural footing established by the Creator. And in this we may see the reason why the political progress of mankind has been so slow, and why an extensive knowledge of facts must accompany an admission of principles, before societies awake to the necessity of remodelling their constitution, and returning from the systems established in barbarous ages, to the more simple and equitable system which the eye of reason may read in the constitution of harmonious nature. It is ever immutably and irrevocably wrong, that any man, or any body of men whatever, should constrain another man, not a criminal, to labor for the advantage of any save himself and his kindred; yet half a century of agitation was necessary before England withdrew her oppressing arm from the negro; and then the negro was only emancipated by wresting his price from the population of Britain.

Such were two modern instances of the combination of knowledge and reason,—spirit-stirring exhibitions of the energies of a noble people warring for the abolition of injustice, and for the emancipation of legitimate industry.

Notwithstanding the length of our argument concerning the combination of knowledge and reason, we shall not consider it too lengthened, if it in anywise contributes to elucidate those means that must be put in operation for advancing the political progress of mankind. It is the greatest possible absurdity to suppose that all the changes that take place in the political condition of societies are only portions of a routine which, when fulfilled, is to commence again, and again to present the same phases, and the same or analogous phenomena. No; the political progress of mankind is a passage to one definite end, to an ultimatum, to a condition that requires no further change, to

a stable system of law that does not demand perpetual deliberation, but only perpetual administration; and the great question for the political world is, "What is that end? What is that system? What is that ultimatum?" What, in fact, is the political condition of society that controverts no principle of reason, and sins against no precept of religion? for this, we may rest assured, is the ultimate end towards which all civilized societies must progress; no man for a moment can hesitate to pronounce, or to prophesy with unlimited assurance, that the negroes in the slave states of America will ultimately obtain their freedom, and that the serfs of Russia will ultimately be emancipated.

The real history of political progress commences only at that period where the maximum of disparity between the various orders or classes begins to be systematically diminished. From this point (which is chronologically different in the various countries) there is a natural course of progress, different in the outward circumstances of its manifestation, but essentially the same in its abstract characters, in every country that achieves civilization. The essence of this progress is the gradual emancipation of the rights of the serf or unprivileged laborer, and the corresponding diminution of the privileges of the lord. Now it may be observed, that the great revolutions which take place in the earlier portions of this progress are physical force revolutions, changes brought about by the sword, because there are no other means sufficiently powerful to effect them. Nor is it difficult to see why. Were the privileged classes to admit reason as the umpire, there would be no necessity for force revolutions; but as the changes come to be necessary, they must be achieved by such means as will effect them, however undesirable

it may be that such means should be necessary. Where, however, liberty has made a real progress, knowledge must have made a real progress; and where knowledge has progressed, reason becomes as powerful an agent as force and one which ought ever to be chosen if the alternative be in our choice.

The history of civilized communities shows us, that the progression of mankind in a political aspect is, from a diversity of privileges towards an equality of rights.

That one man can have a privilege only by depriving another man, or many other men, of a portion of their rights, consequently, a reign of justice will consist in the destruction of every privilege, and in the restitution of every right.

That under the supreme direction of divine providence, man is the agent employed in working out his own political wellbeing.

That man cannot work out his political wellbeing unless he knows wherein that wellbeing consists. Knowledge, therefore, is necessary to enable man to work out his political wellbeing.

That men must know correctly before they can act correctly.

That the political wellbeing of mankind involves two things—correct knowledge and correct action. Correct action is knowledge carried into practical operation.

That the political regeneration of mankind is depending on the acquisition and promulgation of political knowledge.

That in the laws which should regulate man's political action, there is a truth and a falsehood, as much as there is a truth and a falsehood in matters of geometric or astronomic science.

That the political condition of men can never be what it ought to be, until men have acquired the requisite knowledge; that is, until they have perfected political science, and reduced it to the same form and ordination as any of the other sciences.

That, with the perfection of political science, there will necessarily follow an amended order of political action, and consequently an amended condition of society.

That political knowledge is divided into two distinct branches; First, a sensational branch, which furnishes us with the facts of man's condition, and the actual results of human action; Second, a rational branch which furnishes us with the principles that ought to regulate human action.

The first is political economy; the second is politics, or the science of equity.

That improvements in the political conditions of a country are made exactly in proportion as the truths of political economy and political science are reduced to practice.

That in every country there are privileged classes who have more power or more property than they are justly entitled to, and unprivileged classes who have less power or less property than they are justly entitled to. That the difference between these two classes has been undergoing a gradual but sure process of diminution. This fact we learn from history.

That the further progress of the diminution in the difference between the privileged and unprivileged classes, may be surely anticipated as the continuation of a process that has already been going on for centuries.

That the absolute equality of men in all political rights is the ultimate end of political progression.

That so long as there is not absolute equality of political rights, there is the constant element of further change and consequently good reason for anticipating further change.

That while a single individual may or may not determine his actions according to his knowledge, the constitution of humanity in the mass necessarily determines, that wherever knowledge is obtained, systematically ordinated, and generally diffused, an amended order of action will invariably result.

But as the old condition necessarily involves the interests of some parties (placemen, slave-owners, land-owners, for instance), the transition from the old condition, which was erroneous, to the new and amended condition, is always the cause of a social struggle between the partisans of the old condition and the partisans of the new.

If the change be sought in a country that has attained to liberty of discussion, a free press, a tolerably extensive representation, etc. (that is, where deliberative judgment and not mere will rules), the sword (always an evil, though sometimes necessary) may be superseded by the moral force of truth. Knowledge disseminated will convince the masses, and when the masses are convinced they will combine, and when they combine, the change, sooner or later, will follow as a necessary consequence. But wherever the unjust interests of the ruling classes are required to give way before the progress of knowledge, and those ruling classes peremptorily refuse to allow the condition of society to be amended, the sword is the instrument which knowledge and reason may be compelled to use; for it is not possible, it is not within the limits of man's choice, that the progress of society can be permanently arrested when the intellect of the masses has advanced

in knowledge beyond those propositions, of which the present condition is only the realization.

We posit, finally, that the acquisition, scientific ordination, and general diffusion of knowledge, will necessarily obliterate error and superstition, and continually amend the condition of man upon the globe, until his ultimate condition shall be the best the circumstances of the earth permit of. When the rule of reason and equal justice to all has superseded the rule of superstition and prescription, and when the doctrine of equality has been applied to society and we have no privileges, no hereditary distinctions, and no diversity of conditions, except those of office or those produced by the more or less successful result of industry, skill or enterprise, we shall have a system that contains within itself the construction of a jural society, and also the obliteration of all just cause of war. On this ground we take up the natural probability of a millennium whose natural probability we maintain to be within the calculation of the human reason.

CHAPTER II

THE THEORY OF MAN'S INTELLECTUAL PROGRESSION

THREE are only so many possible sciences, although each science, in its own department, may be pursued indefinitely.

The sciences are capable of being classed on a system which is not arbitrary.

Classification is a mere process of the intellect whereby the sciences are arranged in a certain order, according to a principle. The discovery of the sciences is a historical fact extending over many centuries. We assert that the order of discovery has been correlative with the order of classification. There is, therefore, the strongest ground for believing that the future sciences will be discovered and reduced to ordination in the same order that they stand in the scheme of classification.

Correlative with the sciences are the arts.

The sciences are knowledge, the arts are action.

With the discovery of the sciences, there follows invariably a new and amended order of action. The word art we use as signifying the systematic products of human activity. The fine arts are, to a great extent, the gift of the individual, and consequently are so far independent of science.

The sciences are classed on their complexity.

Let it be remembered that science is not a reality, but only a form of thought. Science exists in the mind, and in the mind alone; it is the mind's mode of viewing reality.

The realities are matter and mind.

Reasoning is subsequent to a propositional knowledge, and is the process whereby a new proposition is made to evolve from two anterior propositions.

The syllogism is the complete expression, in language, for reasoning; and both are correlative with all the active functions of real nature.

Were man incapable of reasoning, he might apprehend all the realities of nature, and classify all on the most perfect system of ordination; but never, by any possibility, could he explain and calculate the functions of realities. Every function is active, and every action involves an agent (or cause); and were man not endowed with the intuitive principle of causation, all motions, combinations, functions, in a word, all changes, would immediately become inexplicable, and the universe would forever remain a vast enigma.

The actual constitution of the human intellect is as absolutely necessary to all science, as is the existence of the realities of which the sciences respectively treat.

This is the necessary order of the mathematical sciences.

Logic; which really includes two sciences.

Arithmetic; algebra; geometry; statics.

In this order, the mathematical sciences must necessarily be classed, and in this order the mathematical sciences must necessarily be discovered. Ten thousand men originating the mathematical sciences by a process of independent investigation, would necessarily discover them in this order; and were ten thousand worlds peopled with human beings to go through the process of making anew the mathematical sciences, every one of those human races would pass through the same intellectual course, and evolve the abstract sciences exactly in the same necessary order. The

constitution of human reason forbids that it should be otherwise; one science being impossible until its antecedent is so well known as to be capable of subjective operation. Thus, unless the laws of identity are known, there can be no investigation of the laws of equality; and until the laws of equality are known, there can be no investigation of the laws of numbers; and until arithmetic is known, there can be no investigation of the laws of quantity; and until the laws of quantity are known, there can be no investigation into the relations of spaces; and until geometry is known, there can be no statics.

Without the mathematical sciences there can be no physical science—there may be classifications, facts, propositions innumerable; but science, which involves the syllogism, there never can be till the abstract sciences are so far advanced as to be capable of subjective application to the real facts of nature.

Logic is the universal form of all science. The mathematical sciences are only logic, with numbers, quantities, spaces, or forces for the terms; and the physical sciences are only logic, with physical realities for the terms. The form remains universally the same.

It is evident that all the physical sciences must be based on the observation of the existence, condition, and function of the real matter with which man is acquainted.

The physical sciences may be termed, nature seen by the reason, and not merely by the senses.

Between the syllogism, the intellectual reason of mankind, and the operations of external nature, there is the most perfect parallelism; and this parallelism affords a most undoubted proof of the objective veracity of the subjective convictions of the human mind.

Were the general convictions of the human reason (its axioms) not true objectively, as well as necessarily true subjectively, the prediction of physical phenomena would be absolutely impossible. And although the philosophic sceptic may by ingenious ambiguities involve that question in doubts and sophisms, surely we may rest satisfied that the same hand that made the heavens and the earth in so wonderful a harmony of order, has not made the human reason only a mockery and a delusion.

All the phenomena of nature are operations—things done. Now, science consists of knowledge, and knowledge exists in the mind. How, then, are we to view the real operations of nature, considered as external to the mind?

The real operations of nature are to be viewed as arts—as divine arts—and their comprehension alone can be called science. The universe is God's great workshop, and man is the rational spectator whose office it is to comprehend the processes that are there carried on. The motions of the planets do not constitute science; it is the rational apprehension of those motions in the human mind that constitutes science. But the principles of mechanics are far more general than all the facts of astronomy; they apply not only to the real sun and the real planets, but to all possible suns, and to all possible matter constituted in a manner similar to the matter with which we are acquainted.

Consequently astronomy, vast as it is, must be viewed only as a real illustration of the principles of mechanics, as an exemplification of dynamics.

We have said that the classification of the sciences, and their chronological discovery, must follow the order of their complexity. After the inorganic sciences, therefore, come the sciences of organization, of

vegetable and animal physiology, showing a continual increase of complexity until we arrive at man, the most complex and most highly organized of all the earth's inhabitants.

But still, though physiology be the highest and most complex of all the physical sciences, there is something beyond it, something that comes after it in the logical order of classification. Man himself has his functions; and when we have considered what man is, we may turn to what man does.

Man is by nature a social being, made to live in society, and his social acts have their laws, which when understood give us a new order of knowledge altogether distinct from the knowledge contained in the previous sciences. And again, men may trespass on each other—may inflict pain on each other—may do evil to each other. Men therefore must legislate.

And here an evident distinction presents itself, which enables us to classify human action. We may ask, "What means will lead to a certain end?" and "What is the end that ought to be produced?"

We have here two social sciences, in each of which there is the same stable truth that prevails in all the other sciences, if man can only discover it and reduce it to scientific ordination. It must be within the reach of man, or else we must admit that all rules of social action are purely arbitrary; that is, in fact, that there are no rules. Such a supposition, however, is perfectly absurd, and can never be consistently maintained.

On the above distinction is grounded the division of social science into non-moral and moral; the one treating exclusively on the relation of means to an end, and the other exclusively on the end that ought to be the object of pursuit.

In these new sciences human action is the element with which we have to reason; and the conditions of men are the phenomena that result directly from that action.

The first of these sciences is political economy, which is purely inductive, and treats of the physical effects of human action so far as those effects are to be discovered in the condition of societies. The second is politics, the science of equity which is purely abstract, and treats of the universal principles that ought to regulate human action, so far as men can affect each other by their actions.

The fundamental noun-substantive of political economy is utility, of which value is the measure. The fundamental noun-substantive of politics is equity, which, having its abstract laws in the very constitution of the human mind, gives us the moral measure of human action.

The principles of this equity are abstract and universal convictions of the reason.

We maintain, then,

First, That the sciences, classed on their complexity, must be classed in the following order:

1st, The mathematical and force sciences.

2d, The inorganic physical sciences, beginning with the most general, and terminating with the most specific.

3d, The organic physical sciences, composed of vegetable and animal physiology.

4th, The sciences that relate exclusively to man, and that treat of human action. These are (1) non-moral, political economy, which treats of the beneficial or prejudicial effects of human action; (2) moral, politics, which treats of the moral character of human action, whether that action be the action of a

single individual towards another individual, or whether it be the action of a whole society, or portion of a society. Politics is, in fact, nothing more than the moral law which ought to regulate the actions of the individual, extended to the actions of men when associated as a political society, the same moral law being obligatory on multitudes that is obligatory on the individual.

This is the essence of human welfare,—truth discovered and carried into practical operation.

Let it be remembered that the progress of mankind in the evolution of civilization, is a progress from superstition and error towards knowledge. Superstition and error present themselves under the form of diversity of credence; knowledge presents itself under the form of unity of credence. Wherever there is knowledge, that knowledge is the same in all parts of the earth, and the same in substance whatever language it may use as the instrument of expression. The progress of mankind, therefore, is a progress from diversity of credence towards unity of credence. There is but one truth, one scheme of knowledge; and consequently, wherever knowledge is really attained, diversity of credence is impossible. Where men differ in credence, they differ because one or all have not knowledge.

We have then to ask, Into what branches is knowledge divided? Into the facts of sensational and psychological observation, rational science, and history.

Next, “In what chronological order have the various branches been reduced to scientific ordination?” The chronological order in which the sciences have been discovered, or reduced to ordination, is correlative with the logical scheme of classification. One

science must precede another in chronological discovery, because it is requisite to render that other science discoverable. The one is the means whereby we attain to the other, just as in a single science one problem must be solved before we can, by any possibility, attain to the solution of another problem. And the law of this dependence of one science on another is, that the truths of the antecedent science which are the objects of research when we study that science, become subjective—that is, means of operation—when we study the consequent science.

It is impossible, therefore, that the sciences should be discovered in any other than a certain order; that is, man must acquire knowledge on a scheme which has laws as fixed and definite as the very laws of the sciences themselves.

We may remark, however, that, although the sciences are necessarily antecedent and consequent to each other, they interweave or overlap each other in their chronological evolution; just as father and son may be alive at the same time, yet the father is necessarily older than the son. And in the evolution of the sciences, we may have several generations on foot at a given period; we may have three, four, five, or six sciences all undergoing the process of evolution, but all at different stages of progress.

Let us take chemistry as the most advanced inorganic physical science, and classify the sciences that follow chemistry in the natural scheme of classification. We have then—

Chemistry.
Vegetable physiology
Animal physiology.
Man-science.

The new term acquired in the passage from the inorganic to the organic sciences, is vitality—life.

The maintenance of animal life is the physical ultimatum of the earth, the last final function of matter. When we proceed beyond this, we arrive at a region where the functions are no longer purely physical; for although man in his political economy may partly be viewed as a higher kind of animal, yet his functions, even in that region, are essentially distinguished from those of animals by the introduction of intellectual computation.

When, therefore, we turn to the sustentation of men associated together in society, we have passed from the region of mere organization, and have entered the sphere of rational intelligence.

The science that treats of the production and distribution of food, and the other physical requirements of man, is termed political economy; and the ultimatum of that science is, “How may the greatest physical good be procured for the greatest number?”

This ultimatum is not arbitrary, as some would almost have us suppose; it is the necessary end of the science if that science have any existence. Just as we are necessarily led to view the surface of the earth in its function of sustaining vegetable life, and the vegetable kingdom in its function of sustaining animal life; so are we led by the very laws of our intelligence to posit the physical benefit of mankind as the ultimatum to which all economical arrangements should tend, if they do not depart from the very intention which is the ground and origin of their existence.

But political economy is a mere computation of antecedences and sequences: it tells what results follow certain conditions; and, generalizing its facts, it at last arrives at the laws which regulate the physical

condition of man, so far as that condition is the consequence of human action. The utmost that it can tell is, "what means lead to a certain end;" but being based purely on observation, it can never lay on us a duty, nor deter us from a crime. Even in its ultimatum, it can only say, that if men do not pursue their advantage, they act irrationally, but never can it say that they act criminally. It computes the mechanism of human action, but never can determine the end of human action. Duty and crime are terms with which it has no concern, and to which it can attach no meaning. It is merely observational, and must confine itself as a science to the generalization of facts, while, when taken as a practical rule of action, its sphere extends no further than the physical wellbeing of mankind; and the "benefit of the greatest number" is fixed on, not from any idea of moral duty, but merely because that ultimatum exhibits the greatest quantity. In no sense is this science one iota more moral than astronomy, which furnishes the practical rule of navigation, or geometry, which furnishes the practical rule of mensuration. To confound it with duty, is essentially to destroy its character as an inductive science.

Human physiology is the last, the highest, and the most complex of all the physical sciences. It is the termination of man's intellectual labors, so far as regards the universe of matter. It is the ultimatum of material manifestation, the final type of complex arrangement, the summit beyond which we leave the material world, and enter into a new region of thought. Nor is it merely a metaphor to say, that "man is the epitome of the world." Every science that precedes human physiology is necessary to the complete understanding of the human frame. But granting that

human physiology is the last and most complex of all the physical sciences, has man no further region into which he may push his inquiries, and extend the field of intellectual research?

Man has his functions—What are their laws?

The most simple functions of man, and those which naturally fall to be considered first, are those in which he acts on the external world.

First, Man may act on the physical world that surrounds him.

Second, Man may act on man.

The principles involved in man's action on man are included under the term social science and politics, when those terms are taken in a general significance.

Social science is divided into two embranchments; namely, political economy, the object-noun of which is social utility; and politics proper, the object-noun of which is equity.

The problem of politics is to discover the laws (principles of the reason) which ought to preside over human actions in the matter of interference.

In both sciences human actions are the substantives with which we reason. In endeavoring to determine the present position of man in his knowledge of political economy and politics, we must premise that we here approach the region where superstition and not science prevails.

Knowledge is credence based on sufficient evidence, and superstition is credence without sufficient evidence.

In the very same order, and to the very same extent, and at the same chronological period that the sciences have appeared, has superstition gradually retired, and taken her new stand in those fields of thought where

the reason of mankind had not yet beheld the divine light of truth.

The whole realm of political science is as yet little better than a superstition.

To observe the manner in which men legislate (and legislators, be they who they may, are only men), we should naturally be led to the conclusion, that there was no truth and no falsehood in political science.

Truth, in fact, has almost as little to do with legislation as it had with alchemy or astrology; and this is the case whatever may be the real matter of truth. Whenever there is no truth to rest upon, there can only be error or superstition.

Every proper science has an object-noun, and the exclusive end and intention of the science is to discover and reduce to logical order the relations that exist between the substantives of the science in that object-noun. Thus, arithmetic treats of relations in number; geometry, of relations in space (position, direction, and extent); dynamics, of relations in force, etc.

Political economy then treats of relations in social utility, and we ask, "What are the relations of this, that, and the other action, or system of action, in social utility?" The answer to this question belongs exclusively to the science of political economy. The same action may be judged in social utility, or in equity; in the former case we are engaged with a question of political economy; in the latter, with a question of politics. Endless ambiguities and discussions arise from confounding the one science with the other.

2d. We now ask, "With what do we reason? what are the substantives of the science?"

We reason with human actions in social utility. Social utility is the object-noun of the science, and the

forms of human action are the subject-nouns, which are to be named, classed, and reasoned with.

Wherever human action is not involved, there is no political economy. Whatever results from the general action of the laws of the non-human universe, does not belong to political economy except just in so far as they are effected by human action. The fertility of the soil produced by human industry, the production of iron, the cultivation, manufacture, and commerce of cotton, wheat, tea, sugar, sheep, cattle, wool, etc., etc.—all these enter into political economy, because they represent certain forms of human action, which have an appreciable value in social utility.

Political economy, then, is the science that treats of human function. Where human function is not involved, we are not engaged with political economy. But then there is a limitation on the other hand. Political economy is a non-moral science, and in no case can be allowed to pronounce a moral judgment. All that it can ever tell us is, whether certain actions or systems of actions are beneficial, indifferent, or prejudicial; and when the terms right and wrong, ought, etc., are employed they are used to indicate correctness or incorrectness in social utility.

Acts of interference, whether by law, or merely by the individual, belong properly to the science of politics, but they may also be legitimately judged of through the medium of political economy. By treating a question of interference by the rules of equity, we arrive at once at a conclusion; whereas, when it is treated by the rules of utility, it may require many years, many observations, and many disputations as to facts, before a conclusion can be drawn. The equity of the slave trade is a question so simple, that few intelligent men could fail to settle it satisfactorily in

a few minutes; but the economy of the trade would require, and did require, many years to settle it, and even now there are not wanting hundreds who, on economical principles, would defend both the trade and the condition of slavery. Although perfect knowledge in both sciences would no doubt lead to exactly the same practical conclusion, the argument of economy is sometimes set up against the argument of equity. The concise reply to such a mode of proceeding is this, "If equity have any existence at all, its rules are necessarily imperative." Deny the imperative nature of equity and you obliterate all morals.*

Now, where there is no interference between man and man, no judgment in equity can possibly be pronounced. Where there is no interference (and nothing that enters religion) economy gives the canon, she holds the balance, and pronounces judgment because the question belongs to the jurisdiction of her court. But where there is interference we can have a judgment in equity; and where we can have a judgment in equity, no economical considerations whatever can ever relieve man from the imperative obligation. The moment it was admitted that economical considerations should outweigh the judgment in equity, that moment is man's moral nature obliterated, and he becomes an animal a little superior to the ourang-outang.

We now return to the mode in which political economy is usually presented.

According to some writers, we should imagine that utility was measured according to the wealth produced. Value, labor, capital, wages, profit, rent, etc., are the substantives of their science; and the produc-

* It is true, however, that the argument of economy has a far more powerful influence on the world than the argument of equity.

tion of wealth appears to be the end, the sum and substance, the object of their desires.

We deny, from beginning to end, this view of political economy. It has some truth in it—the beginnings of truth; but such, in the general, is no more the end of political economy than the determination of the chances in gambling was the end of the calculation of probabilities.

We assert—and we have no doubt whatever that this view will ultimately obtain the suffrages of all—that the welfare of man is the end of political economy.

To this it may be replied, that the production of wealth is the means; and that all economics intend to include the welfare of man as a matter of course.

We deny the whole theory from beginning to end.

We assert that the production of man, and man in a continually higher condition, is the object, the end, the ultimatum of the science.

Let us suppose that one thousand families were employed in the cultivation of one hundred thousand acres of land; that they lived, maintained themselves in decent plenty, reared their families in health, industry, honesty, and those manly qualities which, among the agricultural population of Great Britain, have assumed a higher character than in any other portion of the earth's inhabitants. Suppose that this population produce only as much as suffices for the plentiful support of all the individuals. Good. There is not, on the average of twenty years, any superabundance that can be called accumulated profit.

This population, according to some political economists, would be a most unproductive, most useless portion of society.

We deny the fact. This population has reared and produced men.

Suppose, again, the great body of this population should be set to spin cotton, smelt iron, grind cutlery, and weave stockings. That at these occupations, by incessant toil, they should produce not only as much as support them, but one-half more. According to political economists, these occupations would be incomparably more profitable than the agricultural occupations, and consequently much better for society.

We deny the fact, and scout the inference. The production of man, and of man in his best condition, is the physical ultimatum of the earth; and any system whatever that sacrifices the workman to the work—the man who produces the wealth to the wealth produced—is a monstrous system of misdirected intention, based on a blasphemy against man's spiritual nature.

The whole system of modern manufacture, with its factory slavery; its gaunt and sallow faces; its half-clad hunger; its female degradation; its abortions and rickety children; its dens of pestilence and abomination; its ignorance, brutality, and drunkenness; its vice, in all the hideous forms of infidelity, hopeless poverty, and mad despair,—these, and, if it were possible, worse than these, are the sure fruits of making man the workman of mammon, instead of making wealth the servant of humanity for the relief of man's estate.

The day is not far distant when the Labor of England will hold her court of justice; let those who may await the sentence of the tribunal.

That system of political economy which makes wealth and not man, the ultimatum, is based on a monstrous fallacy—on a fallacy so slavish and so detestable, that the wonder is how accomplished and personally amiable men can be found as its abettors.

The fallacy is, in taking the rents of the landlords,

and the profits of the capitalists, as the measures of good and evil, instead of taking the condition of the cultivators, and the condition of the laborers (the many), as the sure index of the character of a system.

Whatever tends to debase man, to make him physically, intellectually, or morally a lower being, is bad, however much or however little the wealth produced may be.* The wealth is not the stable element; it is an accidental, and by no means the most important adjunct. Man is the stable element. His condition is the standard; his improvement is a good; his deterioration is an evil. And this, independently of all other considerations. All other considerations are secondary, dependent, subsidiary to the great intention. Man is not useful as he produces wealth, but wealth is useful as it sustains man, ameliorates his condition, improves his capacities, gives opportunities for his further cultivation, and aids his progress in the great scheme of human regeneration.

Such views, then, of political economy as make wealth the ultimatum (and this wealth, be it always remembered, is the wealth of the land-owner, the mill-owner, the iron-master, etc., and not the wealth of the multitude of human laborers), are merely the beginnings of the science of political economy. This

* The distribution of wealth is a question of incomparably more importance than even its production. This appears a paradox. It is not so, however. The strong individual appropriates more than his equitable share at the expense of the weak individual; and all privileged classes are merely classes of individuals who have obtained more land, or more power, or more license than equitably could have been assigned to them. The laws of distribution are of incomparably more practical importance than the laws of production, and the public mind will not allow many years to elapse without bringing them to vehement discussion.

science, like every other, must pass through its stages ; it must have its errors, its superstitions, its partial truths, its truths misunderstood, before it comes forth as a system over which man has no power of control, but which he must contemplate as a system of truth designed by the Creator of the world for the instruction of his intellect, and the improvement of his condition.

Political economy is now struggling to assume a position among the sciences. It is daily growing, daily assuming a more definite form, and daily shaking off those questions that do not belong to it.

We must also remark, that the natural science of political economy has labored under the immense disadvantage of collecting facts which were not the result of nature's operations, but which were, in a great measure, the result of human legislation, which varied from time to time, and from country to country.

There is the greatest possible difference between taking advantage of the laws of nature, and originating laws. It is not man's office to originate laws. God has made the laws, and given man an intellect to discover and apply them. As well may man make laws in the physical sciences, or in theology, as in political economy. It is true he may make laws, and enforce them ; but what he never can do is, to make the operation of those laws beneficial to the world. This is beyond his power ; and, though the laws may be for the pecuniary advantage of the privileged classes of a country, they are necessarily followed by a concomitant series of evils, which bear on the masses of the population.

The great truth which political economy will ultimately teach is this, "That God has constituted nature aright ; that it is man's interest to take advantage

of the arrangements of nature according to the laws which God has established in the world; that all human laws originating in man are prejudicial arrangements, which interfere with the course of nature; that all such laws ought universally to be abolished, so that man may have free scope to extract the maximum of benefit from the earth.” Social arrangements for the benefit of all are not laws—they are adaptations of the laws of nature. These are requisite for society; and to these arrangements, legislation, in its economical aspect, ought to be exclusively confined.

When men make lighthouses for the protection of maritime commerce—public harbors for the safety of ships, seamen, and cargoes—when they make a police to watch—when they pave, light, and clean towns—when they make roads and arrangements for communications—when they support such national defences as are judged requisite at any given time—when they support judges and other officers to administer the laws of justice—when they do these, and many other similar acts, at the common expense, and enforce the payment, they do not make laws. They make only such arrangements, based on the laws of nature or equity, as are deemed fitting at a given period; they take advantage of the world, such as they find it, and endeavor to evolve from it a greater amount of good than they could do individually were there no such social arrangements. Men may make laws if they will; but what they cannot do is, to make good to follow them.

From political economy we turn to politics. Before doing so, however, we must remark that no science of politics, whatever be its form, or whatever be its matter, can hope to meet with impartial investigation. Whatever may be the real system of truth

(and a truth there must be somewhere), that system cannot fail to controvert the opinion of multitudes and to be favorable or unfavorable to the pecuniary interests of multitudes.

Admit the fact of human progression, however (nor can it reasonably be denied), and all the objections, and all the difficulties connected with the habitual credence of a present generation, vanish into air. Let political truth be what it may, it cannot receive general adoption at any period. It must grow; it must be suggested, misunderstood, denied, discussed, adopted in part, rejected in part, re-discussed, further adopted, and so on.

Doubts, disputes, denials, and diversity of opinion, therefore, are of little importance. They are natural; they must come. They are the modes in which man expresses his ignorance, and frequently the means he uses to acquire knowledge and determine truth. Where there is diversity of opinion, there must be ignorance on one side or on both; and bold would be the man who, in politics, should assert that he had so completely mastered all truth, that all other men ought to come over to his side. And yet there must be a truth somewhere; and, as knowledge does not admit of diversity of opinion, if ever man can have a system of politics other than empirical, other than superstitious, diversity of opinion must disappear from politics, just as it has disappeared from the sciences which man has already mastered.

Politics has to do exclusively with the relations between men, and to determine the principles that should regulate their actions towards each other. Where interference is not concerned, there is no question in politics. This, then, is the anterior limitation of the science.

We have, now, to determine the posterior boundary—that which separates it from any science that might lie beyond it.

This posterior limit is likely—from the prevalence of socialist and communist doctrines—to become the great desideratum of political theory. Those doctrines, whatever may be the contempt heaped on them in England, are far more generally diffused than most Englishmen are aware of. They are now revolutionizing Europe; and no one can predict the extent of the changes that must follow them, if once they gain the complete mastery of the public mind. Instead of railing at them, however, it is much more profitable to endeavor to understand them, and to seize the fallacy on which they are based.

It is true that men are brethren, the children of one Father; it is true that universal benevolence is a virtue; it is true that man ought not to seek his own advantage at the expense of his fellow; it is true that in the present system of society there are stupendous abuses which cannot be justified. And it is also true that socialism and communism are based on fallacies, although the above truths are ostensibly at the bottom of those systems; no dogmas that have ever been uttered are more communist than some precepts of the New Testament.

All that we have here to do with communism, is to point out the fallacy on which it rests, when advanced, as it is, into the region of politics. This fallacy will be found the moment we can determine the posterior limitation of the science of politics. We cannot turn the torrent of credence that has set in; but it may be possible to give it a right direction.

Political relations are not relations of fraternity. Love, charity, benevolence, and generosity have noth-

ing whatever to do with politics. These substantives, and the principles of action to which they give rise, lie beyond the region of politics. This they do necessarily, just as necessarily as light and sound, optics and acoustics, lie necessarily beyond the region of geometry. Unless this truth is fairly apprehended, and unless the line of demarcation between politics and the regions that lie beyond it is logically determined and clearly perceived, there is a continual danger of sliding imperceptibly into socialism. Whatever may be true, or whatever may be false, in socialism (using that term in the most unobjectionable sense—Christian socialism, for instance), the principles of equity must first be taken into consideration before we can, by any possibility, proceed to the consideration of those higher principles of action which may come into play, when once the principles of justice are acknowledged and carried into general operation.

This question is perhaps, practically, the most important in modern politics. Insurged millions let loose on the world, with vague ideas of fraternity in their heads, with the courage of enthusiasm in their hearts, and with bayonets in their hands, are, at all events, formidable expositors of doctrine. Their energy is exactly what the continent of Europe has so long required; but their ignorance may transform what would otherwise have been a most useful reformation, into a terrible hurricane of vengeance, and a blind exercise of destructive power. Now that the theorist and the orator can raise armed millions, the game of politics has assumed a new character. Theories are no longer barren speculations, nor is oratory mere declamation. It is, therefore, of the first importance that the most cheerful, impartial, and honest endeavor should be made to perfect the theory of politics—to base first

on the immutable foundations of justice—to satisfy the reason before setting the passions in a flame—to evolve principles which can be calmly and soberly maintained by the intellect, before they are given as rules of action to enthusiastic populations, ready to march in any direction that is plausibly pointed out as the right one.

We have no intention, however, to attempt the correction of wrong theories. Wrong theories may be supplanted, but it is questionable whether they are ever corrected. The development of the right theory is the great object. It will do the work if once it can be finally cleared of all logical objection. Men want political truth, and they are making desperate efforts to obtain it; and obtain it they will ultimately, there can be no possible doubt.

Political relations, so far from being relations of fraternity, or of love, or of any of those sentiments that teach us to bear or to forbear, to give or to forgive, are relations of equity. They are relations of justice, which gives nothing, and forgives nothing. They are jural relations, and political society is a jural society.

The moment this truth is forgotten, the door is opened for the wildest and most impracticable schemes. We have, in fact, broken down the barriers of reason, and admitted a flood of wild imagination. We must carefully deny admission to any propositions whatever which cannot show a rational foundation, because they pretend to derive from the higher and more expansive sentiments of the heart. Nothing can be more delusive, nothing more certainly dangerous. Justice is stable, permanent, and strictly regulative. Its rules must determine the form of society, a form which may at all times be enforced. And if, as is the case in all known

countries, that form shall have been departed from, then force may be legitimately used for its restoration.

The moment, however, that we attempt to substitute the relations of benevolence for those of justice, both the scales and the sword fall from the hands of the image. Benevolence can regulate nothing, and enforce nothing. First let me know what is mine, and then inculcate the duties and the pleasures of benevolence. But if nothing is mine, then is there not only no justice, but no possibility of benevolence. The moment property is abolished that moment is the practice of benevolence (such, at all events, as involves the objects of property) abolished also. The foundation, therefore, of political society on benevolence is suicidal; the only possibility of benevolence being the admission that something is mine (service or property) which I may lawfully give, lawfully withhold, but which I may choose to give if I please, when actuated by benevolence.

Love, benevolence, charity, fraternity, therefore, cannot enter a system of politics. No human society could be founded on them that attempts to regulate the distribution of natural property, and the allocation of that increased value which is created by the labor of individuals. Love may, to a certain extent, reign in a family; but in a state composed of a multitude of independent (although social) individuals, each producing according to his skill, energy, perseverance, and accidental opportunities, justice must be the regulative principle, without which the society falls either under the hand of tyranny, or falls into the equally destructive condition of anarchy and confusion.

We posit, therefore, that political society is a society whose essence, end, and intention is to exhibit, in realization, the principles of equity or justice.

Although, however, benevolence has nothing to do with politics, it has much to do with man. And as it does lie beyond politics, its laws, whatever they are, or wherever they may be derived from, will fall to be considered at some period or other. Towards them the world is progressing, and after a reign of justice there will fall, in necessary order, a reign of benevolence.

But if politics be the science of justice, and justice does not admit the idea of benevolence, that idea being necessarily posterior to justice, what is the radical distinction between justice and benevolence, and where is the line of demarcation that separates them?

That line of demarcation is found in the distinction between the negative and the positive.

A very simple consideration will place in a clear enough light the difference between the negative character of justice, and the positive character of benevolence.

If all men were socially passive, and did not in anywise interfere with each other, there would be the perfection of justice, while there might be the total absence of benevolence.

No rule of justice can ever originate an interference. All interference based on justice is consequential; that is, the consequence of a prior act of interference, which requires to be corrected. All primary interference, contrary to the will of the person interfered with (he being of sound mind, sober, etc.), is an injustice. The essential character of injustice consists in the forcible interference of one man with another; nor is any man justified in constraining another to receive even a benefit (or what nine hundred and ninety men out of a thousand would pronounce a benefit) against his will. The essential character of injustice is, the overbearing of one man's will by another man's

force or fraud. And no rule or principle of equity can ever originate such an interference.

The whole scheme of justice, therefore, is essentially and radically restrictive, and all its positive rules, or rules which justify or command interference, will be found to consist of those which justify the restoration of things to that condition in which they would have been had there been no interference. That is, whenever the negative state of non-interference has been departed from, and the equilibrium of equity destroyed, justice furnishes rules for positive interference, whereby the negative state may be restored, and the equilibrium of equity re-established. But this in no wise affects the assertion, that the principles of justice, and the scheme of the science, are entirely restrictive; because, let all society be in the negative state of non-interference, and it would remain so forever were the rules of justice attended to.

Benevolence, on the contrary, supposes that men shall be socially active; not that they shall interfere with each other without consent, but that they shall take a constant interest in each other's welfare, and be ready to offer the helping hand of sympathy when sorrows fall upon their brethren. Benevolence cannot infringe justice, it only superadds more than justice could require.

Such a condition of society, then, as would be compatible with the perfection of justice, might exclude benevolence altogether. Consequently, justice and benevolence are radically distinguished from each other; and politics, which is the science of justice, is independent of benevolence.

Here, then, we learn the posterior limit of the science of politics.

Where there is no question of interference between

man and man, there is no question of politics. This is the anterior limit, that which separates it from all that comes before it; from political economy, the physical sciences, and the mathematical sciences.

And the posterior limit is found in the fact, that the science is confined exclusively to the exhibition of the laws relating to such interference as is consequent on a departure from the state of non-interference, and to the exhibition of the laws (intuitions of the reason) which prohibit all primary interference. [The latter, of course, come logically first in the exposition of the science.]

Having, then, determined the limits of the science of politics, we affirm (from the preceding data) that its position is immediately after the science of political economy, and that it is followed by the laws of benevolence, wherever these may be derived from.

CHAPTER III

THE THEORY OF MEN'S PRACTICAL PROGRESSION

WE have now to make good our argument that there is a natural probability in favor of a millennium, or reign of justice. We maintain that man has, within the range of his natural knowledge, sufficient means for determining, that if the course of human history continue ordained on the same principles that may be inferred from a consideration of the past and present, then in the future there must come a time when justice shall be the regulative principle of the earth, and man shall carry it into systematic and universal operation.

After all that has been said of the millennium, we cannot help thinking that there is a peculiar satisfaction in finding that nature, history, and reason contribute to authenticate the promise.

To condense the argument we posit, that human progression is from logic and the mathematical sciences, through the physical sciences, and up to man-science.

Man-science has four functions:

Action on the external world.

Action on man, without interference.

Action on man by interference.

Actions towards the Divine Being.

The second class of functions gives rise to political economy, which furnishes the rule of correct action.

The third class to politics.

The fourth class to religion, the scientific groundwork of which is theology.

Correct knowledge is the only means whereby correct action can be performed. In advancing, therefore, the probability of a millennium in politics, we must, of course, imply that a millennium in other departments has actually taken place, or is now taking place. And this we do. The definition of a millennium is, for us, not any period of time, but a period of truth discovered and reduced to practice. And consequently, when we speak of a political millennium, we speak of a period when political truth shall be discovered and be reduced to practice; and such a period we maintain to be within the bounds of rational anticipation.

What, in fact, is the problem of politics? To discover the laws which should regulate men in the matter of interference. When those laws are discovered, political truth is discovered. What reason can possibly be alleged for asserting that the laws which should regulate men in the matter of interference are not as much within the reach of the human intellect as the laws which should regulate the merchant in carrying on his commercial transactions? It is plainly evident that man, being the most complex of all the objects that inhabit the earth, must be the last whose phenomena are subjected to analysis. Let the sciences be classed as they may, man, and man's functions, must always be placed at the extreme end of the scale of natural knowledge, i. e., of a description of the various steps of the course which the human race must take in its passage to an equitable condition of society; and these must be looked for in the evolution of the sciences one after another. Each new science is not only a revela-

tion to the intellect, but a new power for performing things which could not otherwise have been done; in fact, a new sceptre for man to rule the world, and to bend its elements in obedience to his will.

Let us again repeat, that knowledge is the only means given to man to evolve correct action; and that correct action is the only means whereby man can evolve a correct, and consequently beneficial condition. Let us also note well, that knowledge does not admit of diversity of opinion; that where knowledge is really attained and properly substantiated, uniformity of credence is its constant and necessary result; and consequently, wherever we find diversity of opinion, we have a region where knowledge is not yet attained, or where it is not yet met with general acceptance.

Let us now ask, what is the essence of that ultimate condition of man, expressed for brevity's sake by the word millennium?—A period when truth is discovered, acknowledged, and carried into practical operation.

A millennium is a condition of society in which man shall evolve the maximum of good by acting correctly. And man can act correctly only where he has acquired knowledge. The moment, then, we ascertain the order in which knowledge must be acquired, we learn the scheme of human improvement, and ascertain the general outline of his course, in his passage from ignorance, poverty, and depravity, towards knowledge, prosperity, and virtuous action.

Therefore, the past history of human progress must supply us with the beginning of the natural millennium; and these beginnings we must look for in the sciences that have been already discovered and reduced to practice.

A political millennium will come, but it will come only because it forms a portion of the still greater

scheme of human improvement,—of the more general millennium, that involves all human knowledge and all human operations.

Consequently, wherever we have truth discovered and carried into practical operation, we have a millennium in that department of knowledge.

All scientific truth is the intellect of the creature apprehending correctly the divine arrangements of the created.

All science therefore is divine, and divine, not in the sense of pantheism, but in the sense of its being the correlative object created in harmony with the human reason. Science is the object of reason, and reality is the object of science; and both reason and reality are the productions of the divine Creator. Reason on the one hand, and reality on the other, are the correlatives of creation, and science is the middle term that unites them; reality giving the matter of science, and reason giving the form. Knowledge, therefore, is the divine intention; and all the sciences may be viewed, not as human acquisitions, but as fulfilments of the divine purpose in creating an intellect to comprehend, and an object to be comprehended.

Immediately, then, that we admit science to be not merely human, science acquires a new character. It becomes the exponent of humanity, and points out the order of human progression. We have here a sure basis of operation, a foundation on which the reason may at last rest in constructing its philosophy of man. Science is stable. It shifts not with opinion, and changes not with lapse of ages. Were all knowledge obliterated, and man to begin to-morrow a new course of research, he could come only to the same truths and to the same sciences; and those sciences would evolve in

a similar order, were the experiment to take place a hundred or a thousand times.

We must now inquire how the dogma of knowledge is efficient to produce an amended condition of man upon the globe.

Every science has a millennium; that is, a period when its truths are discovered, acknowledged, and carried into practical operation.

First come the mathematical sciences. A mathematical millennium takes place when mathematical truth is discovered, and reduced to practical operation. Mathematical science is the foundation of man's intellectual and practical progress, and the region of mathematics is the first region in which a natural millennium takes place. Without mathematics we have no astronomy, no geography, no measurement of time, and no systematic navigation, worthy of the name. That is, we have in those departments ignorance or superstition, instead of knowledge.

Next to a mathematical millennium is a mechanical millennium. The mathematical sciences are absolutely essential to the evolution of mechanics, and mechanical knowledge is absolutely necessary to enable man to turn the earth to the best account. One of the first great spheres of mechanical operation is "locomotion."

Let us consider that the earth, as constituted, permits only of locomotion under certain conditions. It is possible for man to have a maximum of locomotive facility. A certain speed will be found beyond which we lose in safety, and below which we lose in celerity without gaining in safety. And this applies to all systems of locomotion. The problem, then, is to discover the best system; that which combines the maxi-

mum of celerity with the minimum of danger. And when we have made as near an approach to this as the circumstances of the earth permit of, we have a locomotive millennium.

We have said enough to show the direct bearing of science on the improvement of man's condition on the globe. Knowledge is obtained, an improved system of action is consequently generated, and from that improved system of action an improved condition arises as the necessary result.

But then, how comes it that, notwithstanding man's vast achievements, his wonderful efforts of mechanical ingenuity, and the amazing productions of his skill, his own condition in a social capacity should not have improved in the same ratio as the improvement of his condition in regard to the material world. In Britain, man has to a great extent beaten the material world, and, notwithstanding this, a large portion of the population is reduced to pauperism, to that fearful state of dependence in which man finds himself a blot on the universe of God—a wretch thrown up by the waves of time, without a use, and without an end, homeless in the presence of the firmament, and helpless in the face of creation.

We do not believe that pauperism comes from God. It is man's doing, and man's doing alone. God has abundantly supplied men with all the requisite means of support; and when he cannot find support we must look not to the arrangements of the almighty God, but to the arrangements of men and to the order in which they have portioned out the earth. Charge the poverty of men on God is to blaspheme the Creator. He has given enough, abundance, more than sufficient; and if man has not enough, we must look to the mode in which God's gifts have been distributed. There

is enough, enough for all, abundantly enough; and all that is requisite is freedom to labor on the soil, and to extract from it the produce that God intended for man's support.

And what is the cause of human pauperism and human degradation? for the two go hand in hand. It is because the social arrangements of men have been made by superstition, and not by knowledge. The sciences, we have shown, lead to an amended order of action, and an amended order of action leads to an amended and improved condition. But we must have knowledge in the department in which we require the condition to be amended. That is, mechanical knowledge improves man's mechanical condition, as regards his power over external nature; agricultural knowledge his agricultural condition; chemical knowledge his chemical condition; and so forth. But social knowledge—that is, social science—is absolutely requisite before we can labor intelligently to improve man's social condition. These are the conditions under which man tenants the globe. Every department of nature, and of man's phenomenology, has its laws; and if those laws are infringed, evil is the immediate, invariable, and necessary result. And if man's social condition is evil; if we find at one end of society a few thousands of individuals with enormous wealth, for which they work not, and never have worked, and at the other end of society millions belonging to the same country, and born on the same soil, with barely the necessaries of life, and too often in abject destitution —there is no other conclusion possible than that this poverty arises from man's social arrangements, and that poor the mass of the population must remain until those arrangements are rectified by knowledge.

If Englishmen discover that pauperism and wretched-

edness are unnecessary; that the Divine Being never intended such things; that the degradation of the laboring population, their moral degradation consequent on poverty, is the curse of the laws and not of nature,—does any man suppose that Englishmen would not be justified in abolishing such laws, or that they will not abolish them? Can we believe for a moment, that if any arrangement would enable the population to find plenty, that such an arrangement will not be made? If any man believe this, he is at all events willing to be credulous. For ourselves, we believe it not.

There are hundreds of thousands of persons in this country who are not earning above 7s. to 10s. per week, even when they have constant employment.

With this a man brings up a family and educates his children. His life is a life of stern economy, and he faces it like a man. He respects himself, and feels that he has a right to be respected. He does manage to live like a moral being, and sometimes escapes the degradation of the poor-roll in his old age. This is the best position of the laborer, the maximum that the present condition of Scotland can afford to the highest class of her laboring children—milk, porridge, and potatoes, and with these he goes through his life of honest independence.

But what is the minimum, what is the condition of the shoals of Irish peasantry who invade the west coast, and the tribes of Highlanders who have little or nothing to do? What can they earn? What food do they habitually use, and what is their moral existence? Let any one visit the Western Islands, and inquire into the social condition of the inhabitants, and the arrangements men have made for the destruction of the population. See scores of men, women, and

children gathering shell-fish on the shore as almost their only food, while the rent of the island is all abstracted, and spent in London or elsewhere; and then say if it be possible that, with such arrangements, any soil, or any climate, or any profusion of natural advantages, would have compensated for the evil arrangements that men have made. Does any one suppose that those same Highlanders, who find a wretched sustenance on the shore, could not, and would not, extract an abundant existence out of the soil of their native island? The law forbids them; that is, men have made such arrangements with regard to God's earth, that the stable population must be reduced to destitution, for the purpose of having one man endowed with a wealth which he, perhaps, knows not how to use, nor even to retain.

And we affirm, without the slightest hesitation, that the very same kind of improvements that have followed the mathematical and physical sciences, will follow social science, and achieve in the world of man far greater wonders than have yet been achieved in the world of matter. It is not trade Britain wants, nor more railroads, nor larger orders for cotton, nor new schemes for alimenting the poor, nor loans to landlords, nor any other mercantile or economical change. It is social change,—new social arrangements, made on the principles of natural equity. No economical measure whatever is capable of reaching the depths of the social evils. Ameliorations may, no doubt, be made for a time; but the radical evil remains, still generating the poison that corrupts society.

The evil is expressed in a few words; and, sooner or later, the nation will appreciate it and rectify it. It is “the alienation of the soil from the state, and the consequent taxation of the industry of the country.”

Britain may go on producing with wonderful energy, and may accomplish far more than she has yet accomplished. She may struggle as Britain only can struggle. She may present to the world peace at home, when the nations of Europe are filled with insurrection. She may lead foremost in the march of civilization, and be first among the kingdoms of the earth. All this she may do, and more. But as certainly as Britain continues her present social arrangements, so certainly will there come a time when—the other questions being cleared on this side and on that side, and the main question brought into the arena—the labor of Britain will emancipate itself from thraldom. Gradually and surely has the separation been taking place between the privileged landowner and the unprivileged laborer. And the time will come at last that there shall be but two parties looking each other in the face, and knowing that the destruction of one is an event of necessary occurrence. That event must come. Nor is it in man to stay it or to produce it. It will come as the result of the laws that govern nature and that govern man.

We may as well attempt mechanical impossibilities as political impossibilities: and, notwithstanding the almost universal prevalence of the current superstition about the rights of landed property, we have no hesitation in affirming that a very few years will show that superstition destroyed, and the main question of England's welfare brought to a serious and definite discussion.

In politics there are only two main questions—first, personal liberty; second, natural property. England has been at work for centuries in the endeavor to settle the first; and, when that is definitely settled, she will give her undivided attention to the second.

The first and most obvious requirement in a country, is some degree of security for life, liberty, and property. This gives birth to criminal law, the great end of which is ostensibly to prevent crimes. The minor proposition, "What is a crime?" requires to be determined on exactly the same principles as we determine "What is a square?" or, "What is the orbit of the earth?" Without this determination, made on principles which are not arbitrary but scientific, law is despotism; and no man in the world is morally bound to obey it, except as Scripture may enjoin him to obey even unjust laws. If legislatures will make arbitrary crimes—that is, make actions legally criminal which are not naturally criminal—no population is bound to obey them. On the contrary, it becomes one of the highest duties of man to resist such laws; to use every effort to procure their abolition; and, if he cannot do so by reason, then do so by force. The welfare of humanity demands this at the hand of every man; and the base and slavish doctrine of non-resistance is fit—not for men who study truth in God's universe—but for hireling sycophants, who care not what man may suffer so that their vile carcases are clothed and fed. The liberties we have in England are mainly owing to the fact, that England would not tolerate the determination of crime by the executive rulers, but reserved this for the deliberate assembly.

Ultimately connected with the theory of crime (much more so than is usually imagined), is the theory of natural property. The law assumed crime arbitrarily, and proceeded to punish it; it assumed property arbitrarily, and proceeded to protect it. The king, who had the power to make or unmake crimes, had the power to dispose of the land that belonged to the state. He sold or gifted it, and thus in the long run the whole

of the lands of England, with some trifling exceptions, have been alienated from the nation, and the burden of taxation has been placed upon the people. Superstition (that is, unfounded credence) was at the bottom of the king's right in both cases; and the present inhabitants of the British islands are bound to observe the laws, made in former times, concerning crimes and property, just in so far as those laws are now equitable, or would now be re-enacted were there no laws on those subjects. The present possessor of a portion of land derives not one iota of present right from the former gift of a defunct monarch; and his right, to be now valid, must be such, that were all his titles destroyed the nation would proceed to place him in possession of the lands, because he, as an individual man, had an equitable claim to them. Just as, if all the laws and statutes of England were destroyed, the nation would proceed as usual to the arrest and punishment of the murderer and robber—those persons being punished, not because there are laws for their punishment, but because it is just that they should be punished, and just that there should be laws to punish. The justice of the punishment does in no case derive from the law, but the whole force and validity of the law derives from the justice of the punishment; and where the punishment is not just, that punishment is a crime, whatever the law may be, or whatever it may declare.

One striking fact is apparent in considering the past history of laws with regard to crimes and property. The laws with regard to crimes have been considered alterable, the laws with regard to property have been considered unalterable. One generation of legislators and rulers made an action a legal crime; but the next generation did not on that account con-

sider itself bound forever so to esteem it. On the contrary, every generation of legislators has considered itself at full liberty to alter, revise, amend, and abolish such laws, according to its own judgment. But with regard to the king's gift of lands it has been quite otherwise. The deeds of past rulers have been supposed to extend to all future generations; and the doctrine now prevalent is, that the lands once alienated by the king's gift, could not be reassumed by the nation without a breach of equity—without, in fact, committing that crime abhorrent in the eyes of aristocracy, “attacking the rights of property.” This discrepancy is at once explained, when we reflect that the legislators of Britain have been for the most part the landlords themselves, or those so immediately connected with their interests, that the government was to all intents and purposes a landlordocracy. But the question still occurs, and must occur again and again, “If the acts of past rulers were not morally permanent with regard to crime, how can they possibly be so with regard to property? and if they are morally permanent with regard to property, how can they be otherwise with regard to crime?”

We have now to show that crime and property are not distinct, in fact that, so far as regards legislation, they are identical; and that the laws (or king's grants, which are in fact nothing else than laws, although this fact is overlooked) regarding landed property, are neither more nor less than laws regarding crime. Property is usually regarded as an object, as something essentially distinguished from action. Yet we shall undertake to show that action alone is concerned, and that all laws regarding property are merely laws regarding action. And if we succeed in doing this, we have unhinged the superstition that prevails on the

subject of landed property,—we have loosened the fabric of aristocracy, and laid open a question that for many years to come will occupy the attention of Great Britain. There is already in the public mind a very extensive suspicion that the present distribution of the land is the true and main cause of England's distress and Ireland's wretchedness; but the supposed difficulty of presenting a scheme which should be perfectly just in theory, and practicable and beneficial if carried into effect, appears to have deterred many from openly attacking the question, and from subjecting it to the same kind of calm and rational investigation so lavishly accorded to other questions of incomparably less importance. The apparent hopelessness, also, of effecting any radical change in the present system, and the fear of advocating "wild" doctrines, have both exerted an influence in repressing investigation. This apathy, however, cannot continue long. Whatever may be the result, the investigation cannot fail to be made.

We now undertake to show that the gift of the land by the king, is nothing more than a law affecting action; and, consequently, is of the same character as a law relating to crime. And if so, it must follow the general course of the laws relating to crime; and if those laws are not morally permanent, neither is the king's gift of land morally permanent, but may be revised, amended, or abolished, exactly in the same manner as a law affecting crime. And over and above, we maintain, that neither the one nor the other is one atom more valid, or more binding, on account of legislation, but that they are right now, or wrong now, wholly and solely according to their own merits; that the law cannot make a crime, although the law may call an action by this name, and treat it as such; and

that the law cannot make a portion of land property although it may call it property. Both crime and property are anterior to law, and superior to it: and it was not to make either the one or the other, but to prevent the one and protect the other, that legislative law was called into existence. Law is not the moral measure of right and wrong; but the rule of practice for the policeman, constable, jailer, judge, sheriff, and hangman; and until law is absolutely perfect, there is a canon higher than the canon of law, one more valid and more stable—the canon of reason—to which law itself must be subject.

A law against crime is a public declaration that certain acts ought not to be performed; and that he who performs them shall be visited with certain specified penalties. This, we maintain, is exactly the essence of the king's grant of landed property, because the law declares that if any persons use the land without permission of the grantee, they shall be punished.

Now the essential part of this political arrangement is this:—"All persons in the nation are forbidden, under pains and penalties, to use a certain portion of land, with the exception of the grantee, or by his permission." This, then, is essentially a law against action—a law declaring that to use a certain portion of land is a crime for the vast majority of the population.

Now, if we turn to the effects of this arrangement, we find that this grantee is in no respect bound to make the land produce. He may utterly neglect it; nay, he may, as has actually been done recently in the Highlands of Scotland (and as the king did himself ages ago at the New Forest)—may drive off the population, drive off the sheep (the food of the man), and convert the district into a game desert for his own

amusement—he having plenty of wealth, derived perhaps from other lands, wherewith to support these costly pleasures—at the expense of the nation.

Such, on the side of the grantee, is the limit of liberty. Let us now ask, What the limit is on the part of the nation? No matter what may be the state of the land—even if it is lying waste, and producing nothing for man's support, as is actually the case in many parts of the kingdom—no man in Britain may put into it a spade or a potato, to save his family from starvation, without incurring the penalties of the law. He would be a criminal (the law would call him so), and he would be treated as such.

This state of affairs represents the extremes; and all that is better than the extremes is due, not to the law, but to the laws of nature. Now, the law has done this grievous injury; it has deprived the poor of the natural remedy whereby they would have corrected so enormous an abuse. Let us suppose that there was no law, and that one man claimed thirty thousand acres for his amusement. Other persons require the land for their support. They begin to occupy it, and he endeavors to repel them. Now, what would be the natural consequence? What ought the cultivators to do? Should they retire and starve? or expatriate themselves? They would resist the aggression by force, and in so doing they would only do their duty. But the law will not allow them to resist. The law has first deprived them of the land, and then enlisted a standing army to prevent them from using the natural means of recovering it.

No truth can be more certain than that God gave the land for the benefit of all; and if any arrangement interfere with, or diminish that benefit, then has man as man, as the recipient of God's bounty, an un-

doubted right to alter or abolish that arrangement, exactly as he alters his arrangements in agriculture, in medicine, in mechanics, or in navigation. No more crime, and no more wrong attaches to his alterations in the one case than in the other.

Political improvement takes place exactly as men discover and definitely determine the true nature of crime; and exactly as they confine their laws to the prohibition of those actions which are crimes, and to the non-prohibition of those actions which are not crimes. The laws of man cannot make a crime, neither can they unmake a crime. Crime is logically anterior to human legislation, and the very end and intent of legislation in its first and most essential capacity is,—to prevent crime.

All nations with which we are acquainted have punished as crimes actions which were not crimes; and the gradual improvement of the laws of man in this respect, is one of the great phenomena that we learn from history.

But while we have a positive major proposition, we have also a negative major proposition, which is—

“No action that is not a crime ought to be prevented by the law.”

Now, as legislators and rulers are only men (there is no divine wisdom, nor divine sacredness about them), they may be the criminals as well as any of the population. It is quite easy for the generality of writers on these subjects to treat of crime as committed by the population. They see so far, and sometimes their views are valuable and correct. But they have first perched the government on a great height, which they do not intend to survey; and then they confine their observation to the subject population. To include both at one view appears a stretch beyond their power,

and hence their admirable dissertations are unsatisfactory; and by unsatisfactory, we do not mean that they are not distinguished by talent of the highest order, and by upright sincerity; but that they treat only one portion of the phenomenon, and omit its correlative. Exactly as if one were to write an able dissertation on the earth's motion, furnishing us with a perfect diagram and specification of the orbit, and an exact determination of the velocity, and yet should altogether omit to mention the sun. Such a dissertation, let its details be as perfect as they may, would be altogether unsatisfactory; because the correlative, the sun, has not been exhibited in its relations to the earth.

And so it is with crime. He who studies crime as a portion of man-science, must include in his view the whole phenomenon, and must inquire what does man do, as man. And when we turn to Britain with this principle, we must regard the whole population, king, lords, commons, soldiers, judges, laborers, paupers, in fact, the whole mass of society, as merely men. And when we define crime, and find that actions coinciding with that definition are performed by any of these parties, by whatever name they may be called, or under whatever pretences they may appear, we must not hesitate to call the action by the name of crime, and to say, "this is a crime committed by men." Reverence for law as law, as a human rule of action *de facto* enacted by legislators, is mere debasing superstition; nor, however venerable law may be in some men's estimation, do we consider either their law or their worship of it at all entitled to respect. Men venerate law and care nothing for justice, just as they venerate the priest and forget the Deity.

The Almighty Maker and Ruler of mankind will

have men subject to justice and not to men; and the very moment the rules of justice, which vary not, nor can vary, are departed from, that moment is man relieved from his allegiance to the ruler; and if the population have the power, they may arrest the rulers, and bring them to the same judicial trial that would be reserved for the individual.

Hence the necessity for a “science of justice,” that men—definitely ascertaining, on principles which are not arbitrary, the real actions which are criminal—may appoint a first magistrate to carry into execution the laws of justice. And this first magistrate—king, president, or anything else—is not to govern men, but to regulate them according to the laws of equity; and in performing this function, he occupies the highest position to which man may attain, and, performing his duties with impartial sincerity, he merits the constant respect, aid, and support of every person in the land. This portion of the British constitution, the first magistrate king, the independent judges, and the jury from the locality, is unsurpassed, if not unequalled, by anything in the whole history of man. In England, we have in this portion of our political mechanism, the most profound reason for thankfulness to God. Had the slave-owner been tried, he could not have been convicted because of the law; but had the legislature been tried for making laws to allow slavery, and for using the British arms to support it, there can be no question that, if the ordinary decisions were adhered to, the jury would have found the legislature guilty, and England may proudly say that her judges would not have hesitated to pronounce the condemnation. Definitely to determine what is a crime and what is not a crime is one of the first great problems of political science. We define crime to be,

“a breach of equity”; and consequently we maintain that whatever is not a breach of equity is not a crime, and under no circumstances whatever ought to be prohibited or restricted by the laws. Absolute freedom, then, to perform every action that is not a breach of equity, constitutes the great final termination of man’s political progress, so far as liberty is concerned.

But what is man’s final termination with regard to the other great substantive of politics, property?

Here we approach a subject that, in the course of a few years (in all probability), will be the great element of strife and contention. Here is the rock on which England’s famous constitution of King, Lords, and Commons, will suffer its final shipwreck. Such an assertion is, of course, at present a mere opinion; but if the scheme we have advanced be in the main correct, then we do not hesitate to affirm, that if we continue that scheme into the future, we may see that the question of landed property will be the cause of a stupendous struggle between the aristocracy and the laborocracy of Britain, and that its final settlement will entail the destruction of the constitution. And the question lies in narrow bounds, all that is required being an answer to a question virtually the following: “Is the population to be starved, pauperized, and expatriated, or is the aristocracy to be destroyed?”* Let the political arrangements be what they may, let there be universal or any other suffrage, so long as the aristocracy have all the land, and derive the rent

* By the destruction of the aristocracy, we do not mean the destruction of the aristocrats, any more than, by the destruction of pauperism, we should mean the destruction of the persons of the paupers. It is to the system that we refer exclusively, and only as either system has been created by the arrangements of men.

of it, the laborer is only a serf, and a serf he will remain until he has uprooted the rights of private landed property. The land is for the nation, and not for the aristocracy.

But it is necessary to understand what we mean by a lord and a serf.

A serf is a man who, by the arrangements of mankind, is deprived of the object on which he might expend his labor, or of the natural profit that results from his labor; and consequently is under the necessity of supporting himself and his family by his labor alone. And a lord or an aristocrat is a man who, by the arrangements of mankind, is made to possess the object; and who consequently can support himself and his family without labor, on the profits created by the labor of others. This is the essential distinction between the lord and the serf; and we maintain that the constitution of the world forbids that any arrangement of this kind should result in any other than an evil condition of society, which must necessarily condemn a large part of the population to physical degradation, and if to physical degradation to moral degradation. No instance can be adduced of a population reduced to extreme poverty (as must ever be the case where the land, the great source of wealth, is allotted to a few who labor not), where that population has not been also and in consequence reduced to moral and intellectual degradation, and where the spirit of man has not been depraved and borne down by the circumstances in which man, and not God, has placed him.

The history of the acquisition of liberty (in Britain, for instance) is only the history of the gradual destruction of the privileges of the lord, and of the legal title which the serf has from time to time succeeded

in establishing to those natural rights of which he has been deprived.

We are fully aware that there exists in the minds of many persons a vague apprehension, that if the present laws relating to landed property were to be disturbed, evils of the most malignant character would invade the society of Britain. Nothing can be more absurd, more puerile, more dastardly. The very same fears have prevailed with regard to every other change that has taken place; and, down to the last change that man shall make in his political arrangements, we may rest satisfied that the craven, the place-man, and the aristocrat will not fail to vent loud lamentations on the evils which, in their estimation, are sure to follow. The arrangements of mankind have established diversities of rights affecting the possession of the earth, which the Creator intended for the race; and thus one man was endowed with vast extents of territory, while, on the other hand, multitudes were thereby necessarily deprived of everything except their labor. So singular a system could only originate in the reign of power, and could only be perpetuated through the ignorance of the masses of the population. But the arrangements of mankind with regard to the earth did not stop here. One generation was not content with making arrangements which were to be in force for that generation alone; but laws were enacted, and customs were acknowledged whereby the arrangements of one generation were to descend to future generations, and to be imposed on men not yet born, who were to be born into a world already portioned out, and consequently to which they had no title. Those, therefore, who were born into the world in a country where the land had been accorded to individual proprietors, could obtain their livelihood

only by labor for other men; and as those to whom the land had been accorded could not cultivate it themselves, and as the land was required for the support of the population, the laborers were under the necessity of paying a rent to those who thus procured a vast revenue without labor. This system of diversity of rights to the natural earth, which God intended for the race, being perpetuated from generation to generation, entails with it, as its necessary attendant, that baneful condition of society, in which we have a few aristocrats endowed with vast wealth without labor, and a multitude of laborers reduced to poverty, destitution, and sometimes to actual starvation.

No political truth requires to be more strenuously impressed upon the world, than that the men of every succeeding generation have the same right to make their own arrangements, unburdened with any responsibilities, restrictions, diversities of rights and privileges, other than those restrictions imposed by the general laws of equity, or those diversities of office which they may agree to make for their general advantage.

If, then, we admit that every generation of men has the same free right to make its own arrangements, and to carry into effect the principles it knows or believes to be true, quite independently of the arrangements that have been made by any anterior generations, we must also of necessity admit, that the earth and all it contains, belongs, for the time being, to every existing generation, and that the disposition of the earth (as the great storehouse from which man must derive his support and sustenance) is not to be determined by the laws, customs, arrangements, king's gifts, or prescriptive rights of any past generation of men, but by the judgment and reason of the existing generation, ordering all arrangements according to the rules of

equity, which are always valid and always binding, and which at every given moment of time are the rules which ought to determine human action. Consequently the question at every period is, "What is the equitable disposition of the earth?" The great problem is to discover "such a system as shall secure to every man his exact share of the natural advantages which the Creator has provided for the race; while, at the same time, he has full opportunity, without let or hindrance, to exercise his labor, industry, and skill, for his own advantage." Until this problem is solved, both in theory and in practice, political change must continually go on.

Absolute equalization in the eye of the law with regard to natural rights, is the final termination of man's political progress, the last term in that grand series of changes that commenced with the two opposite elements—the lord and the serf; and which will terminate with the one element—the freeman without privileges and without oppressions.

There cannot be the slightest question that the progression of modern states is towards universal suffrage; that is, towards absolute equalization of the political function of the individuals of whom the state is composed. The necessary attendant of universal suffrage must be, "the equal eligibility of every member of the state to fill any office in the state."

When a state arrives at this ultimatum with regard to the political function of each individual, the question of natural property must fall to be discussed; and as no possible reason can be alleged why one individual should *à priori* be endowed with more of the earth (which God, the Creator and Father of mankind, has given to the human race) than any other individual; and as every generation of existing men must

have exactly the same title to a free earth, unencumbered with any arrangements of past generations, we may rest satisfied, that through whatever transformations men may pass, the ultimate point at which they must necessarily arrive, is absolute equality with regard to natural property. And if so, the intention of Providence will then be realized, that the industrious man shall be rich, and the man who labors not shall be poor. Such is the intention of nature, and such is the intention of the Almighty Maker of mankind.

The great social problem, then, that cannot fail ere long to appear in the arena of European discussion is, "to discover such a system as shall secure to every man his exact share of the natural advantages which the Creator has provided for the race; while, at the same time, he has full opportunity, without let or hindrance, to exercise his skill, industry, and perseverance for his own advantage."

Of this problem, we maintain that there can be but one general solution possible; and the whole analogy // of scientific discovery assures us that, sooner or later, the problem will be solved, that the solution will be acknowledged, and that it will be transformed from an intellectual dogma into a practical rule of action, thereby presenting a realization, in outward condition, of those propositions which the reason has seen to be correct.

The solution we propound is the following, although, of course, there is no supposition that any general solution can be immediately applicable to the circumstances of this or any other country.

We shall speak of England alone, and consider the state of England as composed of an indefinite number of members, all equal in the eye of the law, all on a parity with regard to primary political function, and

all equally eligible to fill any office to which they may be elected by the suffrages of the majority. All authority of man is of course excluded, and the canon of right is the science of equity—that is, the rules of divine and immutable justice, as capable of being apprehended by the human reason.

[Even if it were true that there ought to be an inequality of rights among the individuals of the human race, it would be absolutely impossible to determine which individuals of the race should be born to more rights, and which individuals to fewer rights, than their fellows.* An inequality of rights can only be based on superstition, and the very moment reason is substituted for superstition in political science (as it has been in physical science), that moment must men admit that no possible means are known by which an inequality of rights could possibly be substantiated.]

The state of England, then, would present a soil (including the soil proper, the mines, forests, fisheries,

* “Whilst we maintain the unity of the human species, we at the same time repel the depressing assumption of superior and inferior races of men.” “There are nations more susceptible of cultivation, more highly civilized, more ennobled by mental cultivation, than others, but none in themselves nobler than others. All are in like degree designed for freedom—a freedom which, in the ruder conditions of society, belongs only to the individual, but which, in social states enjoying political institutions, appertains as a right to the whole body of the community.” “If we would indicate an idea which, throughout the whole course of history, has ever more and more widely extended its empire, or which, more than any other, testifies to the much contested, and still more decidedly misunderstood perfectibility of the whole human race, it is that of establishing our common humanity—without reference to religion, nation, or color, as one fraternity, one great community, fitted for the attainment of one object, the unrestrained development of the psychical powers. This is the ultimate and highest aim of society, identical

etc.; in fact, that portion of the natural earth called England) which was permanent, and a population that was not permanent, but renewed by successive generations.

The question then is, "What system will secure to every individual of these successive generations his portion of the natural advantages of England?" Of this problem, we maintain that there is but one solution possible.

No truth can be more absolutely certain as an intuitive proposition of the reason, than that "an object is the property of its creator"; and we maintain that creation * is the only means by which an individual right to property can be generated. Consequently, as no individual and no generation is the creator of the

with the direction implanted by nature in the mind of man towards the indefinite extension of his existence. He regards the earth in all its limits, and the heavens as far as his eye can scan their bright and starry depths, as inwardly his own, given to him as the objects of his contemplation, and as a field for the development of his energies. Even the child longs to pass the hills, or the seas which enclose his manor-house; yet, when his eager steps have borne him beyond those limits, he pines like the plant for his native soil; and it is by this touching and beautiful attribute of man, this longing for that which is unknown, and this fond remembrance of that which is lost, that he is spared from an exclusive attachment to the present. Thus deeply rooted in the innermost nature of man, and even enjoined upon him by his highest tendencies, the recognition of the bond of humanity becomes one of the noblest leading principles in the history of mankind."—Humboldt's *Cosmos*, vol. i. p. 368; *Bohn's Edition*.

* In the arts, man creates form; in political economy, he creates value; and in politics, he creates property. And as the evolution is in this order—1st, the Arts; 2d, Political Economy; 3d, Politics; the laws of political economy must be discovered before there can be a system of property rational in its theory and scientific in its form.

substantive, earth, it belongs equally to all the existing inhabitants. That is, no individual has a special claim to more than another.

But while on the one hand we take into consideration the object—that is, the earth; we must also take into consideration the subject—that is, man, and man's labor.

The object is the common property of all; no individual being able to exhibit a title to any particular portion of it. And individual or private property is, the increased value produced by individual labor. Again, in the earth must be distinguished the permanent earth and its temporary or perishable productions. The former—that is, the permanent earth—we maintain, never can be private property; and every system that treats it as such must necessarily be unjust. No rational basis has ever been exhibited to the world on which private right to any particular portion of the earth could possibly be founded.

But though the permanent earth never can be private property (although the laws may call it so, and may treat it as such), it must be possessed by individuals for the purpose of cultivation, and for the purpose of extracting from it all those natural objects which man requires.

The question then is, upon what terms, or according to what system, must the earth be possessed by the successive generations that succeed each other on the surface of the globe? The conditions given are—First, That the earth is the common property of the race; Second, That whatever an individual produces by his own labor (whether it be a new object, made out of many materials, or a new value given by labor to an object whose form, locality, etc., may be changed) is the private property of that individual, and he may

dispose of it as he pleases, provided he does not interfere with his fellows. Third, The earth is the perpetual common property of the race, and each succeeding generation has a full title to a free earth. One generation cannot encumber a succeeding generation.

And the condition required is, such a system as shall secure to the successive individuals of the race their share of the common property, and the opportunity without interference, of making as much private property as their skill, industry, and enterprise would enable them to make.

The scheme that appears to present itself most naturally is, the general division of the soil, portioning it out to the inhabitants according to their number. Such appears to be the only system that suggests itself to most minds, if we may judge from the objections brought forward against an equalization of property.

But men must go forward, never backward. To speak of a division of lands in England is absurd. Such a division would be as useless as it is improbable. But it is more than useless—it is unjust; and unjust, not to the present so-called proprietors, but to the human beings who are continually being born into the world, and who have exactly the same natural right to a portion that their predecessors have.

The actual division of the soil need never be anticipated, nor would such a division be just, if the divided portions were made the property (legally, for they could never be so morally) of individuals.

If, then, successive generations of men cannot have their fractional share of the actual soil (including mines, etc.), how can the division of the advantages of the natural earth be effected?

By the division of its annual value or rent; that is,

by making the rent of the soil the common property of the nation. That is (as the taxation is the common property of the state), by taking the whole of the taxes out of the rents of the soil, and thereby abolishing all other kinds of taxation whatever. And thus all industry would be absolutely emancipated from every burden, and every man would reap such natural reward as his skill, industry, or enterprise rendered legitimately his, according to the natural law of free competition.* This we maintain to be the only theory that will satisfy the requirements of the problem of natural property. And the question now is: how can the division of the rent be effected? An actual division of the rent—that is, the payment of so much money to each individual—would be attended with, perhaps, insuperable inconveniences; neither is such an actual division requisite, every requirement being capable of fulfilment without it.

We now apply this solution to England. England forms a state; that is, a community acting through public servants for the administration of justice, etc. In the actual condition of England, many things are at present unjust; and the right of the government to tax and make laws for those who are excluded from representation, is at all events questionable. However, we shall make a few remarks on England as she is, and on England as she ought to be; that is, as she would be were the rules of equity reduced to practical operation.

1st. The state has alienated the lands to private

* We have no hesitation whatever in predicting that all civilized communities must ultimately abolish all revenue restrictions on industry, and draw the whole taxation from the rents of the soil. And this because the rents of the soil are the common produce of the whole labor of a community.

individuals called proprietors, and the vast majority of Englishmen are born to their labor, minus their share of the taxation.

2d. This taxation of labor has introduced vast systems of restriction on trades and industry. Instead of a perfectly free trade with all the world, England has adopted a revenue system that most materially diminishes both the amount of trade and its profit. And, instead of a perfectly free internal industry, England has adopted an excise that is as vexatious in its operation as can well be conceived. Both the customs and excise laws, and every other tax on industry, have arisen from the alienation of the soil from the state; and had the soil not been alienated, no tax whatever would have been requisite; and were the soil resumed (as it undoubtedly ought to be), every tax of every kind and character, save the common rent of the soil, might at once be abolished, with the whole army of collectors, revenue-officers, cruisers, coast-guards, excisemen, etc., etc.

3d. Taxation can only be on land or labor. [By land we mean the natural earth, not merely the agricultural soil.] These are the two radical elements that can be subjected to taxation, capital being originally derived from one or the other. Capital is only hoarded labor or hoarded rent; and as all capital must be derived from the one source or the other, all taxation of capital is only taxation of land or of labor. Consequently all taxation of whatever kind is,—1st, taxation of labor, that is, a deduction from the natural remuneration which God intended the laborer to derive from his exertions; or 2d, taxation of land, that is, the appropriation of the current value of the natural earth to the expenses of the state.

Now, labor is essentially private property, and

land is not essentially private property, but on the contrary is the common inheritance of every generation of mankind. Where the land is taxed, no man is taxed, nor does the taxation of land interfere in any way whatever with the progress of human industry. On the contrary, the taxation of land, rightly directed, might be made to advance the condition of the country to a high degree of prosperity.

4th. For the expenses of a state there must be a revenue, and this revenue must be derived from the taxation of labor, or from the rent of the lands. There is no other alternative; either the rents of the soil must be devoted to the common expenses of the state, or the labor of individuals must be interfered with; and restrictions, supervisions, prohibitions, etc., must be called into existence, to facilitate the collection of the revenue.

The political history of landed property in England, appears to have been as follows:—

1st. The lands were accorded by the king to persons who were to undertake the military service of the kingdom.

2d. The performance of this military service was the condition on which individuals held the national land.

3d. The lands were at first held for life, and afterwards were made hereditary.

4th. The military service was abolished by the law, and a standing army introduced.

5th. This standing army was paid by the king.

6th. The king, having abolished the military services of the individuals who held the national land, resorted to the taxation of articles of consumption for the payment of the army.

The lands of England, therefore, instead of being

held on condition of performing the military service of the kingdom, became the property of the individuals who held them, and thus the State of England lost the lands of England. And the military service of the kingdom, instead of being performed by those individuals who held the national land, was henceforth (after the reign of Charles II.) to be paid for by the general taxation of the inhabitants of the country.

Therefore the present system of taxation, and the national debt, the interest of which is procured by the forcible taxation of the general inhabitants of England, are both due to the alienation of the lands from the State, inasmuch as the national debt (incurred for war expenses) would have been a debt upon the lands, and not a debt upon the people of England. If, therefore, the legislature had a right to abolish the military services of those who held the national land, and thereby to impose on the general community all the liabilities of the military service of the kingdom, the legislature has the same right to abolish the general taxation of the community, and to allocate to those who hold the land all the expenses that have been incurred, and that are still incurred, for the war charges of the kingdom.

The alienation of the land from the state, and its conversion into private property, was the first grand step that laid the foundation of the modern system of society in England,—a system that presents enormous wealth in the hands of a few aristocrats, who neither labor, nor even pay taxes in proportion to those who do labor; and a vast population laboring for a bare subsistence, or reduced sometimes by millions to the condition of pauperism.

So long as this system is allowed to continue, it appears (from the constitution of the earth, and of man's

power to extract from it a maintenance) an absolute impossibility that pauperism should be obliterated; inasmuch as the burden of taxation necessarily falls on labor, and more especially as the value of labor is necessarily diminished wherever there is a soil allocated to an aristocracy.*

The three events which have at last left the lands of England in the hands of a small number of aristocrats, are these: the suppression of the monasteries; the abolition of military tenures; and the enclosure of the common lands.

Yet every one of these events has a right side as well as a wrong side. It was right to abolish the monasteries and the military tenures, but it was iniquitous to transform the lands thus obtained into the property of the aristocracy.

The enclosure of the common lands, again, was a proper measure, inasmuch as the lands were producing a little; and every measure that caused the lands to produce more for the consumption of the country was so far beneficial. It would have been quite absurd to leave the common lands in pasture, while their enclosure would produce for the service of the country

* In fact, it is the disposition of the land that determines the value of labor. If men could get the land to labor on, they would manufacture only for a remuneration that afforded more profit than God has attached to the cultivation of the earth. Where they cannot get the land to labor on they are starved into working for a bare subsistence. There is only one reason why the labor of England, Ireland, and Scotland, is of so little marketable value, and that reason is, the present disposition of the soil. The lands of England have been disposed of according to two laws—the law of the strongest and the law of the most cunning; hence England's pauperism and England's moral degradation. There yet remains another law, and its reduction to practice will, one day or other, regenerate the social condition of the population—the law of equity.

a much larger quantity of food. But these allotments were assigned, under enclosure acts, not to the occupiers, but the owners of the cottages. Thus almost *a complete severance has been affected between the English peasantry and the English soil.* The little farmers and cottiers of the country have been converted into day-laborers, depending entirely upon daily earnings, which may, and frequently in point of fact do, fail them. They have now no land, upon the produce of which they can fall as a reserve whenever the demand for labor happens to be slack.

And now it is necessary to inquire, “Why does it happen, that in the richest country in the world a large portion of the population should be reduced to pauperism?” Until the causes of pauperism are satisfactorily ascertained, and until the remedy is applied to the cause, no remedial measure can do more than alleviate the evil. Apply the remedy to the cause, and the evil is eradicated. The cause, or at least one of the great causes, is that expressed in the words quoted above, “the severance between the English peasantry and the English soil;” and until the peasantry recover that soil, the inhabitants of England may rest satisfied that the curse of pauperism will pursue them. The British public can never be sufficiently reminded that there need have been no taxes had it not been for the alienation of the land from the state.

No truth appears to be more satisfactorily and more generally borne out by the history of modern Europe, than that the progression of men in the matter of liberty “is from a diversity of privileges towards an equality of rights;” that is, that the past progress has been all in this direction since the maximum of diversity prevailed in the aspect of individual lord and individual serf. And if this be the case, it

cannot be an unreasonable conclusion, that if sufficient time be allowed for the evolution, the progress of change will continue to go on till some ultimate condition is evolved. And that ultimate condition can only be at the point where diversity of privilege disappears, and every individual in the state is legally entitled to identically the same political functions. Diversities of office there may be, and there must be, but diversity of rights there cannot be without injustice.

Such, then, is the theoretic ultimatum that satisfies the reason with regard to its equity, and such is the historic ultimatum that the reason infers from the past history of mankind. Such, then, is the point towards which societies are progressing; and when that point is reached, the ultimatum of equity is achieved, and the present course of historical evolution is complete.

The next steps required to lead society towards its final destination are questions for the practical statesman.

Diversity of opinion may arise between two men who are both apparently in the right, if the attention of the one be directed to what is theoretically right, and the attention of the other to what is practically expedient as the next step which the present balance of powers in the state renders possible. The one takes the unchangeable and imperishable element of man, the objective reason, crowns it with imperial authority, and demands that all should at once acknowledge its supremacy. The other takes the variable element of man—his subjective condition—and, rejecting every dogma that claims to be absolute, discourses only on the proximate possibility of improving that condition.

Between these two parties, therefore, there is not

so much a perpetual warfare, as a perpetual misunderstanding. Their point of view is different. They stand on different elevations, and have quite a different range of horizon.

To a certain extent, both are necessary—both are workers in the great field of human improvement and of man's amelioration. Incomprehensible as they must ever be to each other (till the last final item of change shall bring both to an identity of purpose), they are fellow-laborers in the scheme of human evolution. The one devises afar off the general scheme of progress; the other carries the proximate measures of that scheme into practical operation. The one is the hydrographer who constructs the chart; the other, the mariner who navigates the ship, ignorant perhaps what may be its final destination.

The theorist, too often trusting to his individual perceptions, forgets that propositions which appear to him of absolute certitude, can never be accepted by the world until they have received a far wider authentication than any one man could possibly bestow upon them. And though perchance he might evolve some propositions which should ultimately be able to stand their ground, experience will prove that the diffusion of truth is no less necessary than its discovery. Truth, like leaven, must pervade the mass before the requisite transformation is effected. On the other hand, the man of practice moves, for the most part, as he is impelled by the convictions of the multitude, and his object is not to theorize but to design the requisite changes, and to carry them into execution. The theories of to-day he regards with indifference or aversion; they are of no practical avail; he is pressed with the necessity of action, and forgets that he moves in action because the multitude have moved in mind;

and that the multitude moved in mind because they had imbibed the theories of former speculators, and changed their credence under the influence of conviction. He forgets that change of action comes from change of credence, and that change of credence comes from theoretic speculation. He forgets that if there were no theories there would be no change, and if no change no necessity for him to execute it.

In assigning, then, a theoretic ultimatum to man's political progress, we posit—

That absolute equality in the eye of the law, without the slightest distinction of individuals or classes, is the ultimatum of political progression; and this ultimatum is the only condition that satisfies the requirements of the reason, and the only condition that presents a rational termination to those changes which, according to history, have been gradually taking place for centuries.

CHAPTER IV

SENTIMENTS OF THE HUMAN MIND WHICH HAVE RULED SOCIETY

BUT while an equality of human rights may be posited as a logical ultimatum that satisfies the reason it must be remembered that the practical ultimatum is the organization of society on true principles, instead of on false principles.

In Britain, the constitution of civil society, like that of ecclesiastical society, has only once been subjected to systematic arrangement.

The Church, as one association, presented itself under the form of the Papacy; the state, as one association, presented itself under the form of the feudal system. The Papacy was the complete organization of the Church on false principles; the feudal system was the complete organization of the state on false principles; and the history of modern society is the history of the gradual destruction of those two great systems.

The feudal system was organization on false principles, but it was organization; and so long as the organization was genuine and spontaneous, the feudal system was the true and living expression of man's necessities. The leader was a leader, a lion-heart who could dare and do. He led because he could lead, and was followed from instinct, which knows its leader and follows him. But when the feudal system was trans-

planted from the field to the court the life of feudalism was gone.

It became hereditary, and as neither courage nor skill are hereditary, hereditary warriors are mummies. When the force organization of society gave way to the law organization of society, the hereditary principle was transplanted into the legislature, and men became hereditary legislators. But wisdom is no more hereditary than courage and skill; and the hereditary system of legislation—the parchment feudalism—became as inefficient as the hereditary system of defence—the pennon feudalism. A new element was required, and a new element appeared—wealth produced by trade,—not merely trade, but trade beginning to be organized and systematized.

It must be observed that the feudal system had no place for the trader. The trader is a non-feudal element in society, and belongs to a different system of organization. His day is fast approaching, and he will ultimately push out hereditary feudalism from the direction of the state. He began without a place, without a rank, and almost without ordinary protection. He asserted his claims, however, and at length society began to admit a portion of the trade principle. This, like everything else, began on false grounds; with privileges, charters and a hundred other interruptions to the laws of nature. Finally the burgesses were tolerated because they had money and could pay taxes, and gradually the traders have pushed their way against the parchment lords. The Commons have taken up the power. The Commons are partly knights who represent proprietors of land, and partly citizens and burgesses, chosen by the mercantile interest of the nation. The lords have retired in solemn decency,

and the knights and burgesses direct the affairs of Britain.

To suppose, however, that this change is ultimate, would be contrary to all the teaching of history. Parchment lordship is contrary to the credence of modern times. Men are beginning to believe that he who does not work ought not to be supported, as those who do work support the whole. The war lord worked, and worked hard. He fought, or was ready to fight, and his life was at stake for his wages. He deserved his reward. He was a man who led men; and so long as he was a real war lord, and war was the real pursuit, he was a genuine man, and filled an office for which men were willing to accord him wages. When he became a parchment lord, he still worked. He made laws and ruled the country. He was to a certain extent necessary, like the bishop, who once worked also, and ruled the church. And in former days, the rule of the Church was no more a jest than the rule of the state. It was a real office—a thing not of silks and drawing-rooms; but of the translation of the Word of God, and appearance at the martyr's stake when requisite. The bishop was a pastor, a real, genuine pastor, who had a flock and cared for it; and even now, if it were possible to reanimate the bishop, and make him again a leader, a genuine leader of men, there is no man in the country who could count followers with him. But the office is no longer requisite.

Every human system dies, but beneath the surface of the human systems there is a reality which does not die—a reality which evolves. All systems preserved by law beyond their natural existence are mummy systems. So long as the credences last, the systems

are natural, and do not decay, but when the credence advances, the system is no longer the expression of man's requirements; and the system if preserved can do evil, and only evil. With the advance of credence the system ought to advance also; for man in perpetuating systems perpetuates only the expression of his former ignorance. The trading community are fast, very fast, pushing out the parchment holders: merchants are now the notables, the men of note who express the requirements of the country.

But the pursuit of money is no more the ultimate pursuit of man than the pursuit of war or pleasure. The trader, in his turn, must cede the first place to those who express man's higher requirements. Money is a means, not an end; and when those who represent the means have played their part, those who represent something beyond the means will assert their claims, and push the trader from the direction of the State. Man is a rational and a moral being, and his rational and moral nature must ultimately prevail to determine the arrangements of society.

Out of the courtly pleasures grew courtly policies, and it became the ambition to be a statesman. An age of policy ensued, but the policy statesman is making way for the trader. The trader's day is now, and every day will see the policy and pleasure laws clearing away because they interfere with trade. The policy system is not yet dead, only dying.

Trade imperceptibly, and almost unconsciously, begins to influence policy, not by denying that policy ought to rule, but by discovering and making manifest that certain acts which were assumed to be politic are actually disadvantageous; that they involve loss and not profit, and consequently that they ought not to be done; and the moment acts of policy come to be

accurately measured instead of having their value assumed, the policy system is defunct, and political economy, which has grown out of it, supersedes it. That political economists will ere long take the direction of the state, appears beyond a doubt.

But neither is political economy the ultimate. It is a step beyond policy, as the reign of court policy was a step beyond the reign of court pleasure. But it is logically insufficient. There are questions which it cannot answer, or dare not answer. It must take the money management of the state, and determine the mode in which taxes should be levied, as well as the amount of taxes; and, in determining the mode in which taxes ought to be levied, it must come between two parties,—the laborers who create the wealth of the country, and the landlords who consume the rents. This position will bring political economy to a stand. The difficulty is insoluble to political economy, and a new system must grow, develop, and assume the direction of the country. This new system is necessarily politics, or the science of equity.

Political economy professes to teach how value grows, increases, accumulates, and who makes it. The latter question, solved by a fair exposition of ascertained facts, first systematized, and then reduced to a law, lands society on the grand question, “To whom does it belong?” With this question political economy, as such, has no concern. It is beyond political economy, higher than political economy, and is what political economy is not,—it is final in theory. Let political economy be as perfect as any science can possibly be, beyond it there lies the question, To whom—to what persons—does the created value belong? And first and foremost must come the question of the land. “Who is the proprietor of the created value?” This

question arises necessarily so soon as political economy has discovered who creates the value. And thus, politics, or the science of equity, springs necessarily in chronological order out of political economy; and when economists have directed the state affairs up to those questions which they cannot answer, they must cede the first place to the true politicians, or themselves become true politicians. And when that period arrives, the political evolution is complete, and there is the reign of equity or justice.

On these grounds, imperfectly as we have advanced them, may be projected the natural probability of a period yet to come, when justice shall be realized on earth, to be followed by a period when Christianity shall reign supreme, and call into real and systematic action the higher and nobler sentiments of man.

CONCLUSION

Beneath the outward formula of science there lies the everlasting truth, as beneath the outward forms of nature there lies the everlasting power.

Posterior to the science of equity comes theology—natural theology. By natural theology we do not mean that which is accepted by the Church, but we mean such a natural theology as shall convince intellect as intellect, and thereby produce a unity of credence for the whole race of men.

We have, therefore, to inquire what kind of theology can be taught by reason, assuming in the first place that natural theology is impossible in its complete form until men have arrived at a knowledge of the natural universe.

Against the traditions of false gods and erroneous worship, science enters the lists. It assumes as its

first proposition, to base credence on evidence, and thereby to evolve truth instead of error or superstition. Consequently it will invariably manifest itself in scepticism. Scepticism in its legitimate form is doubt, and doubt is one of the great elements of humanity absolutely requisite to place knowledge on a secure basis. Truth can have nothing to fear, but everything to hope, from the most accurate survey that men can possibly take of the region open to cognition.

Scepticism has to achieve the destruction of superstition, but in the place of superstition it has nothing to substitute. That man should permanently refrain from a theological credence is out of the question. There is either nothing whatever, or there is some permanently enduring something that was anterior to man, that underlies all the operations of nature, and that constructed, and continues to construct, all the varied mechanisms, physical and mental, with which man is acquainted; and this permanent element which man posits, in accordance with the laws of his reason, is what is meant by God. God therefore has a necessary existence to the human mind; and the main question is not whether there is a God—but what, in fact, are the attributes of God?

That there is a proof of God's existence, and of his power and wisdom, so perfectly conclusive that it shall command the assent of the reason of mankind, we have no possible doubt; but that such an argument can be drawn from physical science (further than power is concerned), we by no means admit.

In the works of nature, and the operations of nature man intuitively perceives by his reason a power of force; and the primordial force, if we make nothing

objective but matter, necessarily lands us in pantheism, which is at present the theological credence of a large portion of the scientific men on the Continent. And out of this pantheism there is no scientific exit until mind is made objective, and the facts of mind are brought to bear on the facts of physics; so that what was before only a primordial force becomes an intelligent agent, of whom power is the attribute. Pantheism is the theology of physical science; and if there were no other science beyond physical science, pantheism would be the last final form of scientific credence.

The physical world does not present within the field of contemplation the operation of mind. For this we must turn to man. Man, when made objective, is found to be possessed of intellectual capacity, of executive power, and also of a moral nature, which lays on him the imperative obligation of designing certain ends, and of refraining from designing certain other ends. And as man is as much a portion of nature as is matter, we must have a power of such a character as would account for this moral nature of man, and to have this we must have the transformation of mere natural theology into moral theology. Men may assume the character of the Moral Ruler of the universe, but proven, in the same manner as any other portion of science, it never can be, till moral science is actually achieved and taught as a branch of knowledge.

Nor are we to admit mere assumptions, and presumptions, and speculations, as science in the world of morals any more than in the world of matter. Either it is true that a definite rule of moral action can be discovered by the reason, or it follows of course that rules of action are not naturally imperative; and

if they be not naturally imperative it can only be a superstition to consider them as obligatory.

We have already considered human action as far as it involves the laws of political economy which treats of the production of wealth. After that comes social science, treating of the distribution of wealth, and finally, politics, which treats of the laws which should regulate interference.


These last two alone are entitled to the name of moral science, which lays down the laws of human duty. Thus, the consideration of man's relation to man is the first period at which moral science makes its appearance.


Every attempt to make a more complete theology than science really warrants, only produces scepticism on the part of those who find an inconclusive argument advanced as a demonstration. Moral theology, strictly and purely scientific, is at present impossible (that is, impossible for the world): and impossible, because moral science has not yet made its appearance, and because moral theology depends on moral science, and is an inference from it. In Britain, of course, Scripture is the source of theology, and moral theology is derived from the written revelation. But on the Continent, philosophy is the theology of the great mass of thinking men; and their theology, derived from the revelation of nature, does actually follow the development of science. And as scepticism was first posted with its negation, and then pantheism with its more general affirmation, and now, instead of a mere power, an intelligent power is beginning to be seen as absolutely necessary to explain the phenomena of nature, we may rest assured that, with the development of social science and moral science (which cannot fail to undergo their evolution in their order),


there will arise necessarily a moral theology, and the world will be indoctrinated with the theology of a moral Deity.


Now, if it be true that all human science ends in morals, and that natural theology follows the development of science (and it can never legitimately be in advance of science), then natural theology will come ultimately to be a purely scientific moral theology, and will thus be brought to the point where man identifies the God of Nature with the God of Scripture. And thus the long-lost unity will be once more restored.

THE END











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